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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Lacanian Perspective on Literature,  
Translation and the Reader’s (Inter-)Subjectivity:  
Read My Text and Tell Me Who You Are 
 
 
by 
 
 
CHENG On Yee Franziska 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
My purpose in this research is to raise some theoretical issues in the study of 
literature and translation. One dominating attribute of a piece of literary text is its 
poetic linguistic features, e.g. ambiguity, irony, contradictions and linguistic tension. 
However, these traits of literary texts are theorized by Julia Kristeva as the 
manifestation of the drive’s dismantling of what Jacques Lacan characterizes as the 
Symbolic, hence an almost schizophrenic collection of disruptions of the relation 
between the signifiers and the signifieds. I intend to push this argument further into 
the realm of translation, arguing that even though it is impossible to achieve an 
equivalent translatum, it is possible to contain most of the meanings, or even 
plausible to create extra layers of meanings to the text through rendering the target 
text with the application of theories and the utilization of homophones.  
 
This exploratory thesis takes Translation as its broad topic. More specifically, I am 
interested in the theory of translation, as well as the practice, as it applies to 
‘transgressive’ texts in English being translated into Chinese (as language and 
culture), Jeanette Winterson as a case-study example. In the body of this paper, I 
provide an experimental translation of the first few complex sentences of the 
beginning of the first Sappho chapter in Art & Lies (2005), which demonstrates how 
the application of Lacanian psychoanalysis may help in the interpretation as well as 
translation of complicated literary texts. The target text would, ideally, preserve 
multiple layers of meanings and can be read in some other meaningful way after the 
application of interdisciplinary theories. In this dissertation, I embrace a heuristic 
rather than a correctness-based approach to translation which focuses on the 
explorations of various possible creative multileveled translations. I do not attempt to 
translate Winterson according to traditional translation norms, and do not attempt to 
apply Lacanian theory to translation in a rigid and dogmatic way. In other words, the 
production of the best, or even a defensible way to translate, is not my purpose of 
translation and hence is not any underlying premise of the birth of this thesis. 
 
Moreover, in this dissertation I investigate the nature of reader’s intersubjectivity in 
reading, as neither writing nor translation may be separated from the reading activity. 
As for intersubjectivity, I refer to the subjectivity of the reader which is dominated 
 by Other, for sub-ject is a person who is controlled and voiced over. The two 
prevalent manifestations of the Other in reading is the Other as Author-God and the 
Other as Text. It is the reader’s intersubjectivity (rather than simply subjectivity) 
because these Others do not exist ontologically but only “survive” as an unconscious 
force in our mutual consciousness, something similar to a shared belief, a collective 
phenomenon. By discussing and comparing the two Others, the Other as the Author-
God and the Other as Text, I demonstrate how these two seemingly contradictory 
Others do not bring about dramatic differences in the two subjectivities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Translation and its Nature  
 
 Translation, the rendering of a text from its source to its target language, is a 
difficult and demanding task. It requires the translator to possess not only an 
excellent mastery of linguistic skills and the cultural connotations of both languages, 
but also an exquisite sensitivity and awareness to subtle cultural differences. An 
episode which occurred to an acquaintance of mine at a sister institution in Hong 
Kong recently has caught my mind while I’ve been considering the nature of 
translation. Studying for a Master of Arts in Translation at a university with a good 
reputation in Hong Kong, my colleague, a mainlander who is native in Mandarin 
Chinese, submitted an assignment which required her to translate a literary text from 
English into her Chinese. As is well known, literary translation is an especially 
difficult activity demanding a range of skills and knowledge. When the graded paper 
was returned from her teacher, she noticed a comment which she perceived as a very 
serious criticism. The teacher’s remark which traumatized her confidence was a 
deceptively simple remark: ‘你的中文太歐化！(Your Chinese is too European!)’.  
 Shocked and depressed as she was, my colleague attempted to understand 
what was meant by this comment. If she had been told that her English was 
inadequate, she would have understood immediately, as a second language can 
always stand improvement. If particular lines of translation had been marked as 
either wrong or in some way inadequate, again she would have known what to do 
about it. But to be told that her Chinese is too European is harder to grasp. She 
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figured that probably the teacher was commenting on aspects of her translation that 
had more to do with implicit cultural emphases that showed her own points of view, 
points that stood in some kind of ideological or cultural contrast to those of her 
teacher. In other words, the way she sees the world, perhaps also politically, as this is 
reflected linguistically in her translation, is somehow ‘wrong’. It also occurred to her 
that her teacher was himself unaware of his hidden ideological assumptions, though 
the traditional Chinese context and the status of the teacher as authority meant that 
she could not say this to him. 
 This anecdote spoke to me powerfully in two senses: the first is that a 
translatum may never be separated from a translator’s background; the second is that 
no interpretation of any text may be separated from the reader. I will go into the first 
one here, and then the second one. As for the relation between translator and 
translatum, it is both arrogant and ignorant to aver that a translator’s subjectivity 
does not enter into the process of translation, for it is definite that a translator’s 
cultural, political, religious, educational as well as family background will influence 
the way that s/he perceives and re-presents the texts.  
 Undoubtedly, if we are to consider not only the field of Translation Studies 
but most societies, there is a mainstream celebration of what Douglas Robinson calls 
a “metempsychotic translation” (63), which can be partly traced back to the 
translation of the Bible. The term “metempsychosis” refers to the ancient Greek 
notion of the transmigration of souls from one body (through death) to another; the 
concept of metempsychotic translation was first introduced in Translation & Taboo 
(1996), using metempsychosis as a metaphor for the traditional ideal for translation, 
in which the meaning as the disembodied soul of a text is removed from the “dead 
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body” of the source text and reincarnated in the body of the target text, without 
change.  
 The counternormative approach to translation that I propose to explore 
heuristically here begins with the perception that metempsychotic translation—the 
dominant ideology of translation as a subordinate, secondary copy of the original, the 
more loyal the better—is overtly patriarchal and masculine, especially if we take 
masculinity to signify a defining, positing way of interpreting and classifying the 
world.  
 Although deviations from the normative “metempsychotic” approach to 
translation are often denounced by non-specialists, discussions of and propositions 
for such counternormative approaches by contemporary academics in Translation 
Studies are not rare. In her essay ‘Gender and the Metaphorics of Translation’ 
(1988), for example, Lori Chamberlain attempted to highlight the patriarchal nature 
of the metempsychotically “ideal” translation, which is, like the superiority of males 
to females, ideologically “normal” to our societies. As defined by traditional Western 
culture, translation is an “archetypally feminine activity” which is “reproductive” 
and “derivative”, “at best an echo”. If the translation in any way “deviates” from the 
source text, it is then considered “artificial, false, and treasonous” (57-58).  When it 
comes to the subject matter of translation, most people “naturally” (unconsciously) 
consider metempsychotic translation “normal” and “proper”—particularly those who 
were raised in the Western nations where Christianity is prevalent, as well as cultures 
influenced by European colonization. Lacan has elaborated the term “nor-mal” as the 
norm of males, which coincides with Chamberlain’s application of gender politics in 
translation studies. And the very interesting term “proper” is remarkably similar to 
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the word “property”—and indeed the relation between the two is patent in patriarchal 
societies.  
 I would therefore like to consider the investigation of the subject matter of 
translation as something more than a listing of “right” principles of translation, let 
alone analysis of any specific translatum or translating experience per se. The nature 
and the activity of translation carry a heavy connotation of gender, which is one 
reason why Lacan, with his teaching of the phallus as the empty signifier of loss 
(symbolic stopping point) and Winterson, as a controversial feminist novelist, have 
come into place. And, when it comes to the subject matter of translation, 
psychoanalysis is an important tool for our study since the production and 
interpretation of translation can never be separated from human subjectivity. Our 
mind constructs and restricts our perception and interpretation of the text, as well as 
everything “outside”, which is why I have reserved Chapter 2 for the discussion of 
reading (inter-)subjectivity. Here, I have especially put down quotation marks on the 
term “outside”, because the idea of “outside-ness” and otherness is much more 
complicated than they superficially see. Can we, and how can we, perceive anything 
“outside”, if every image and idea that we perceive must go through our senses and 
mind?  
 “Deviant” translation is, similar to adultery, a taboo. Like many other taboos, 
this ban on unfaithful translation in some English-speaking countries can be traced 
back to the long history of the rise of European Christianity, in its linguistic and 
translated aspect, and the defense of the translated fiction of the Septuagint and other 
stories. As noted by Douglas Robinson in Translation & Taboo, the church repressed 
the critical thinking of both the translators and the masses by categorizing those who 
realized or spoke of the differences among translations as heretics and then enforced 
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punishment for deviation, which “[g]radually build the fear of excommunication, 
execution, eternity in hell into the normative (and eventually universal) structure or 
‘principle’ of ‘translation’, so that, when Christian civilization becomes ‘civilized’ 
enough not to burn ‘bad’ or deviant translators at the stake, no one will want to 
deviate any longer” (68-9). In other words, the early church took a hard line on what 
was acceptable or not in translations of biblical texts and punished those who 
challenged its authority, and by doing so it created an orthodoxy which plays a 
significant role in the evolution of translation theories in Europe.  
 If we are to look carefully into the premises, any premises, or requirements of 
a “good” translation, it is not difficult to see that all of them are taught, i.e. they can 
never come to us in nature, for there is no such thing as nature without a culture. As 
Jacques Lacan has commented in Seminar XX, the most crucial and arguably the 
only thing that God did in Genesis is to name things.  
 
Genesis recounts nothing other than the creation, from nothing, in 
effect—of what?—of nothing but signifiers. As soon as this creation 
emerges, it is articulated on the basis of the naming of what is. Isn’t that 
creation in its essence? While Aristotle cannot help but enunciate that, if 
ever there was anything it had always been there, isn’t what is at stake in 
creationism a creation on the basis of nothing—thus on the basis of 
signifier? (41) 
 
 The way that we signify and categorize the world shapes our perception of it, 
and this is what Lacan means by articulating that “reality is approached with 
apparatuses of jouissance” and “there’s no other apparatus than language” (Seminar 
XX 55). Reality is, to Lacan, propped up by fantasy, for our common everyday 
reality is an illusion that rests on the repression and overlooking of the real of our 
(illicit) desire. Social reality is, as Slavoj Žižek comments in Looking Awry (1991), 
“nothing but a fragile, Symbolic cobweb that can at any moment be torn aside by an 
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intrusion of the real” (17). Lacan has explained in Seminar XVII that “the coefficient 
of fabrication” perpetuates in our sensation of reality that the reality is constructed by 
our perception of it and this perception per se is an anamorphosis. This is why we 
may never know the thing-in-itself. As John Locke has put it in one simple sentence, 
“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu (Nothing is in the understanding 
that was not previously in the senses)”. However, we, as subjects, are unaware of the 
construction, especially when it is a well-believed one, as we usually internalize and 
rationalize the majority’s standard as the better, the best, and eventually the universal 
law of a certain existence. In Translation & Taboo, Robinson has demonstrated the 
psyche of a “normal” translator (who is voiced over by the normative ideology of 
metempsychotic translation) and the archetypical three-step processes of 
rationalization: Repression, Denial, and at last Rationalization. The social and 
religious institute (i.e. the Church) celebrates metempsychotic translation and sets up 
restrictive norms to repress alternatives, first by direct punishment such as execution 
and excommunication, and later on by the mystification of counter-normative ideas 
as “irrational”, “not-worth-considering” or even “non-existent”. After the continuous 
process of repression and denial, not only the Church but also the people, who were 
long taught to repress and deny, rationalize the preferable premises (metempsychotic 
translation) as the “right” and inevitable way to translate.  
 However, regardless of the constant, enthusiastic denial and denunciation of 
the existence of translators’ subjectivity, which was and still is a common 
phenomenon among not only laymen but also translators, it is important to bear in 
mind that translator’s subjectivity has never been, or more precisely, cannot be 
totally rejected in the mainstream. Not only because it is, from the “normal” negative 
belief, the residue which will always haunt us as human translators but also because 
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human subjectivity and participation lie in the essence of metempsychotic 
translation. In Robinson’s Who Translates (1990), he presented a sophisticated 
argument (through the investigation of spirit-channeling in ancient times) on the 
undeniable existence of translators’ subjectivities beyond reason in target text: 
 
[…] spirit-channels are never perfectly passive. Spirit-channels 
contribute to the channeling process too. Channeling in the spiritualist 
literature is much more of a meeting of minds than it is the total 
possession of a living body by a discarnate mind. As spirit-channels 
describe themselves, they are never the mere helpless instruments of the 
discarnate spirits; they are often highly active, engaged in interpreting the 
sights and sounds and feelings sent to and through them from what they 
describe as the spirit world. So far from being passive invisible conduits, 
in fact, spirit-channels in many cultures have even feared and revered as 
shamans, priests, even as gods and goddesses. (16) 
 
 Through a vivid explanation of the nature of spirit-channeling, Robinson 
argues that entirely passive translator has never existed even back in the ancient time, 
when Christians believed in the theory propagated by Philo Judaeus, the Christian 
myth of the 72 divinely inspired translators of the Hebrew Bible at Alexandria (the 
Septuagint). These translators, Robinson suggested, have never been thought of as 
“passive conduits or vessels”, surprisingly contradictory to the dominating belief, 
sprung from this myth, that translators are empty machines of function other than 
passing the soul (meaning) of a text from one body (language) to the other. 
Translators are, according to the Christian legend, the origin of metempsychotic 
translation, respected mediums whose subjectivity cannot and should not be denied 
or neglected.  
 This dissertation is not only a paper on translation, or the application of 
psychoanalysis on English-Chinese translation; it is, simultaneously, a thesis on 
literature. I attempt to investigate and understand literature through translation, by 
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looking into other significant layers of meanings in a text through the interpretation 
of its translatum. After Blanchot and Derrida the elitist cosmopolitan notion that 
deeper understanding of texts moves, and moves only, through translation has 
become a popular, nonetheless controversial notion. Regardless of the 
disappointment and anger stemming from monolinguals and “pure” (English) 
literature scholars, it is nevertheless undeniable that translation can teach us 
something about literature as elite complex writings, and as a “sub-product” of 
cultural and political systems. If we are to consider the nature of translation, it is, to 
simplify, an exercise of reading and rewriting. Rewriting texts, i.e. expressing a 
certain central idea (soul) with diverse signifiers (body), or the failure of it, is, by 
nature, an act of interrogating the texts—an inevitable transgression: to (re)produce a 
translation is to push the source text beyond the otherness of language and culture. 
Think about the eternal futility of taming a foreign text: it is impossible to tame any 
exotic writing perfectly because, to start with, there is an otherness which cannot be 
completely internalized. Despite the famous saying from Shakespeare according to 
which “that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet”, we must 
not forget that languages do shape the way we categorize and interpret things. A very 
simple example is the term 人中, literally “human-centre”, which is exclusively 
generated to refer to the medial cleft extended from the nose to the upper lip (ending 
at the cupid’s bow) on human beings. This concept of 人中 is significant to the 
Chinese culture, for it plays a very important role in Chines face reading. The depth 
and length of a 人中 is believed to foretell the number of children by implying the 
ease of fertility, which was crucial, especially to women, in ancient times.  
Although we have the word “philtrum” in English, it was not specifically created to 
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refer to human beings: there is a “dog philtrum” and a “cat philtrum”, and to refer to 
humans we will have to add the term “human” before “philtrum”. 
 Lacking of a special signifier for the “human philtrum” does not mean 
English-speakers cannot observe the cleft between the nose and the upper lip. 
Provided that their visual ability is intact, people who speak different languages 
should share the same vision when they observe the same object—it is total nonsense 
to suspect that English natives could not see the nasal cleft because they do not have 
a term similar to 人中, just as the fact that there are no suffix-implied tenses in 
Chinese does not mean that Chinese cannot tell the difference between day and night, 
or cannot articulate them. However, what I attempt to argue from the example of 人
中 is that, when English-speakers look at a face, it is relatively less likely for them 
to focus on the depth or length of the cleft, for that part of the body does not signify 
anything significant to them.   
 Here, if we try to recall how Lacan interprets the relation between language 
and reality, we find the issue more complicated. As Lacan believes that language is 
the condition of the unconscious, the way that language works and how it constructs 
images or ideas will enormously influence how our unconscious works. The slip of 
tongue, for instance, of 人中 as the implication of a woman’s anxiety over 
infertility could occur exclusively in Chinese, while this complex concept would be 
impossible to transfer into simple English without the detailed explanation of the 
Chinese cultural background and the patent patriarchal structure in ancient times. As 
a result, there is something more than the superficial meanings of a linguistic term 
which could be translated directly and equivalently, which is the otherness of a 
source/target language.  
 10 
 During the process of translation, one may gradually get used to the solution 
of dealing with this otherness, yet no one can perfectly engulf the otherness in 
language and culture and turn it into anything completely belonging to the “self”, 
simply because it does not stem from and is not contained in the source language and 
culture. This otherness is always in-between and elusively ambiguous. It restlessly 
resists symbolization, while simultaneously representing both and none. If translation 
can achieve any function more than promoting and spreading a text to our foreign 
reader, it would certainly be providing one crucial layer of literary interpretation, a 
layer which is both excessive and deficient. And isn’t it the case that the metaphors 
in the two etymologies of “translation” and “transgression” are similar (“carrying 
across” and “stepping across”)?
 
 
1.2 Jeanette Winterson and Chinese translation 
 
 In this paper I take Jeanette Winterson as a case-study example, so as to raise 
the attention of translation as a means to understand not only her writing but also any 
other complex literary texts. And let me state categorically here at the outset that my 
primary focus is on translation, and specifically a heuristic and transgressive 
exploration of the possibilities of translation for the understanding of literature, and 
specifically of literature as an expression of the human psyche. This is not literary 
criticism: I am not interested in offering a comprehensive interpretation of Jeanette 
Winterson. Nor is it traditional translation criticism, either of existing Chinese 
translations of her novels (though I will do a little of that in passing), or of my own, 
in the ancient mode of “this is why I translated the text as I did.” I am not at all 
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interested in establishing, or even interrogating, “the right way to translate.” Nor, for 
that matter, is it traditional translation theory, in the sense of attempting to establish 
what translation is. What I do here is primarily Lacanian literary theory, using 
Lacan’s thought about language and the psyche to explore literature in the cross-
cultural flows opened up by translation. 
 Winterson’s novels, starting from Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit in 1985, 
have always been complicated and challenging for not only common readers but also 
literary scholars to interpret. Her application of vocabulary, grammar and story 
structure is constantly elusive and ambiguous, which creates difficulty in 
understanding the texts in a traditional, linear way, and hence also in translating 
them.  
 Although it has long been recognized that absolute equivalence is 
unattainable in translation, Winterson’s novels resist translation in a much higher 
degree than most literary texts because her writing is so complexly saturated in the 
linguistic usage of the English language and the cultural background, especially the 
Christian and other myths, of the European countries. However, we cannot deny the 
fact that translating Winterson is an effective exercise in reading her, as it gives us an 
opportunity to contemplate her writing extremely carefully. Moreover, translation 
may help us learn more about literature as literature, precisely because it is so 
difficult. 
 In order to demonstrate how the complexity of literary texts may have an 
impact on translation, I would like to raise two interesting examples from 
Winterson’s writings: the first one is the term “the Word” in Art & Lies, a two-
hundred-page novel published eighteen years ago but never translated into either 
simplified or traditional Chinese. The second one is an overt addition in the content 
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of the simplified Chinese translation of Weight (2005), which is a patently obvious 
ideological smuggling, uncommon and “perverted” for the traditional 
metempsychotic translation.  
 The first example “the Word” demonstrates how religious implications 
determine the perception of the same piece of text by two different ethnic and 
cultural groups. Raised by a pair of zealously religious Evangelist adoptive parents, 
Winterson has been familiar with biblical verses and stories since childhood. Her 
intimate connection with Christianity is profoundly reflected by her frequent 
invocation of biblical connotations in her writing.  
 In the first Sappho section of Art & Lies, Winterson quotes and comments on 
the concept of “the Word” (54-5), which originates from John 1:1 in the New 
Testament: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God.” In the Chinese translation of the Bible, the same verse is rendered: 
“太初有道，道与神同在，道就是神。” The Word is translated as 道 in Chinese, 
which is Dao. Dao in Chinese is “the way”, which as a result refers coincidently to 
another verse in the New Testament, John 14:6, “Jesus answered, ‘I am the way and 
the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me”. And, more 
significantly, the character Dao is, for the Chinese reader, the same Dao in Daoism.  
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deeply investigate the nature of Dao 
and its relation to languages as well as the Lacanian subject, so I would reserve a 
critical discussion about these issues to another occasion. Here, I highlight the 
translational problem of the Word and Dao in order not only to emphasize the 
difficulty in translating Winterson but also to raise an important dilemma in literary 
translation. It is more than the old-school argument over whether the translator 
should give priority to the source text or the target reader, to the literal content or the 
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implicit cultural references—no matter whether a translator goes for a literal or a 
cultural translation, the translation will inevitably mock both the writer and the 
rewriter.  
 If the translator favors a literal translation, the Christian connotation is lost; 
on the other hand, if the translator preserves the biblical connotation, its reference is 
still lost because the target culture modifies the cultural connotation. Christianity in 
Winterson’s work is replaced by Daoism in most Chinese readers’ minds, without 
any single hesitation, because we as Chinese are all raised by the culture in which 
Dao has everything to do with Daoism rather than Christianity. This example 
supports what I suggested in the introduction, that the production of meaning, i.e. the 
interpretation of text, depends far more on the reader than on the writer, and hence 
what “you” reads from my text tells me who you are but never who I am (provided 
that I am the writer).  
 For Winterson’s English reader, the Word carries a biblical connotation; but 
for her Chinese audience, Dao would carry a Daoist connotation, which is arguably a 
more suitable translation of the Logos (Λόγος), “the Word” in Greek, since Dao in 
Daoism carries the meaning of a mystical, powerful entity. Although it is arguable 
whether the translation of Christianity into Daoism is much more justifiable than it 
superficially seems, for both are powerful and well-established religions in the two 
cultures, still we must not overlook the fundamental differences between the two 
religions: the most patent one, drawing the contextualization with Winterson’s 
works, is their attitude towards sex. The Christian church takes a prudish stance and  
condemns sex as the original sin, for which we deserve to be burnt for eternity to 
redeem. However, Daoism suggests that sex is a necessary part of life because it 
believes in the harmony between yin and yang. Achieving this harmony through 
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sexual intercourse (especially when the woman is pleasured and ejaculation is 
withheld) would, according to the teaching of the Daoism sexual practices—“the 
bedroom arts”—keep people in good health and help them attain longevity.  
 Based on this foundational difference between the Christian and the Daoist 
stances on sex, we could imagine how diverse the meanings of the English source 
text and the Chinese translation would be, when the Word and 道 appear in a novel 
with some certain variety of sexual practices, including homosexuality, incest and 
castration. This example speaks vividly to us on how the death of some cultural 
references is determined by numerous factors outside the texts, such as a society’s 
religious, cultural and political background, which has pretty much shown us why 
the search for an equivalent translation of literary texts is always a futile quest. 
Instead of seeking a way to achieve an equivalent translation, the metempsychotic 
translation, the “correct” translation, we should produce interesting translations, 
complex translations, creative multileveled translations which can teach us more 
about literature and help us understand an author—in our case, Jeanette Winterson. 
This is my foremost, basic belief and premise on which this dissertation is based. I 
embrace a heuristic approach to translation and I do not attempt to focus on the best 
way to translate Winterson (or a few, a small group of correct ways to translate it). 
My attention lies on the extraordinary productivity raised from the convergence of 
the creative Chinese translation of Winterson and Lacan, again applied through a 
heuristic rather than a dogmatic approach. Contextualization and consideration of the 
author’s cultural and historical background, or the lack of it, were not given and 
should not be given higher priority than the production and analysis of various 
exploratory Chinese translations. 
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 The second very interesting example which demonstrates the complexity of 
Chinese translations of Winterson and how a translation may impact a source text is 
the smuggling of anti-capitalism in the Chinese translation of Weight, 重量 , 
published by Chongqing Publication House in 2005. In this simplified Chinese 
translation of Weight, an additional assault on capitalism is smuggled into the 
discussion of knowledge and the future, radically patent. In the chapter 
“Boundaries”, on page 133 of the English version, the line “like all dreams the 
details are strange” is replaced by the following short passage summarizing 
Fukuyama’s idea of capitalism ending history: 
 
历史的终结意味着科学的开端。历史的终结，一个具有煽动性的标
题。这就是福山选择它的原因。他认为，历史由相互冲突的意识形
态构成，现在资本主义已经成为全球的主导模式，因而历史被终结
了。 (124) 
 
I have translated its meaning into English, thus: 
 
The end of history implies the start of science. The end of history. A 
demagogic title. This is the reason why Fukuyama picked it. He thinks, 
history is constructed by a struggle between ideologies, now capitalism 
has become the international leading model, therefore history is ended. 
 
  Jeanette Winterson never commented on capitalism in Weight, and therefore 
this additional paragraph definitely seems a bit awkward. If we are to approach this 
translatum from a traditional metempsychotic view of translation, then this translator 
is definitely “deviant” since he “distorts” the source. However, instead of standing at 
the patriarchal viewpoint, I would like to step back and look at this excessive 
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paragraph from a different angle—would this idea be, in any way, similar to 
Winterson’s recurring motifs? 
 Gender is everywhere, especially when it is used in a metaphorical sense. It is 
about thinking patterns, and simultaneously about power difference. Isn’t capitalism 
a hegemonic ideology which oppresses alternatives, like communism? Ideologies 
such as capitalism and democracy become covertly totalitarian in the recent centuries 
in that they seem to be accepted by most people as the way things should be, 
including those who are oppressed in this system—and doesn't this collide with the 
battle that Winterson fights for in her writings, i.e. the war against the dominating 
faces of the Other? If we are to approach the issue from this perspective, it is not 
difficult to see that the Chinese translator of Weight did not “deviate” from the 
“writer’s meaning”—in quotation marks because, as discussed in page 6, every 
image or idea that we perceive must go through our senses and mind, hence exists as 
our construction rather than the thing-in-itself. In other words, it is impossible for a 
(translator as) reader to really know the writer’s meaning; this “writer’s meaning” 
can only be the reader’s guess, i.e. a fiction. Rather than a “distortion”, the Chinese 
translator has, from a certain aspect, reinforced the “writer’s belief” by inserting 
additional content that would, in the eyes of the target reader, collide with or explain 
the “author’s motif”.  
 
 
1.3 Jeanette Winterson and Lacanian Psychoanalysis 
 
 Another significant reason for me to have chosen Jeanette Winterson as a 
case-study example is that her recurring writing motifs fit a psychoanalytic research 
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approach. Winterson is somehow obsessed with the idea that languages form 
powerful, invisible boundaries that restrict human beings in every aspect. 
Throughout her oeuvre she keeps interrogating the nature of language and how it 
shapes our perception of body, sex and desire, as well as how language helps us 
tackle loss and sorrow. These topics, coincidentally (or not so), are some of the 
major research areas that certain renowned psychoanalysts, Jacques Lacan among 
them, have devoted their careers to investigate.  
 Lacan has placed unprecedented emphasis on languages, “the gift of Danaoi”, 
in the formation of the unconscious and hence the Other. His teaching highlights the 
relation between languages and sexuation, body, love, desire, jouissance, loss, 
knowledge, truth, the reality, the unconscious and so on, which are all Winterson’s 
recursive writing motifs. The similarity between their writing topics somehow 
promises their compatibility as well as the productivity from it. It would not be 
overenthusiastic or naive to expect Lacanian theories to provide us an insight into not 
only Winterson’s writing but also every single piece of literature which carries the 
themes suggested above, as well as the subject matter of translation and literary 
translation. Also, if we are to apply Lacanian psychoanalysis from a heuristic 
approach, it is not impossible for Winterson, or in a more general sense, literature 
and the study of translation, to provide us an insight into the understanding of 
Lacan’s teaching. This thesis, in other words, is based on a radically heuristic use of 
both Lacan and Chinese translation. My application of Lacanian theories, even if 
recognized as not absolutely “correct” (systematic, programmatic) to dogmatic 
Lacanians—since Lacan himself never translated this way and he constantly gave 
emphasis on the importance of the patient’s family and cultural background (which is 
contradictory to my Death-of-the-Author approach)—would nevertheless help us 
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understand (again) the Chinese translations of brief passages from Art & Lies, which 
would then help us understand Lacanian theories more complexly as it is the use of 
Lacan in transcending Lacan himself. 
 Winterson, as suggested previously, has always been fighting a battle with 
mainstream ideologies such as heterosexuality, Christianity, and history or science as 
the truth, which are, I argue, some of the dominating faces of the Other. These 
manifestations of the Other shape our unconscious, restrict our desire and embody 
themselves in the gaze of other human beings (or, in the eyes of a statue, a toy, a 
camera lens, etc.). Through the return of the disturbing gaze from the others, we as 
subjects are silently judged and questioned with penetrating accuracy. As a result, 
Winterson attempts to challenge and undermine the long-established systems in our 
society, “the-way-things-are,” which has long been internalized by the majority; and 
in order to do so she promoting another manifestation of the Other, the Other-as-
anarch, the Other-as-child, etc., which would “liberate” us from the dominating 
dimensions of the Other. Yet, we must not forget that this “liberation” from the 
mainstream is, and can only be, a liberation in quotation marks, for this “liberation” 
from the, say, well-accepted ideology of heterosexuality implies the submission to 
another ideology, e.g. homosexuality or bisexuality, relatively less (outwardly) 
supported but still a(nother) manifestation of the Other. After all, there cannot be any 
liberation from the Other unless the subject abandons the Symbolic, which would 
make him/her impossible to communicate with.  
 However, in order to survive as an individual in a society with so many 
oppressive beliefs, it is the task of a writer, a translator, or even a reader, to 
interrogate the dominating ideologies so that we will notice how reality and the truth 
are constructed. There are various cultural norms that we have internalized as the 
 19 
truth, and for a society and the human beings to progress we must understand that 
many taboos, many “unchangeable” rules, are culturally constructed hence are 
changeable. Some people criticize Lacan for pessimistically destroying our hope, 
since he denounces the stupid, unknowing subject as a helpless idiot who is entirely 
controlled by the big Other, but it is precisely because subjectification is not fixed 
that change, and therefore hope, is promised.  
 There is a Chinese proverb which I find to coincide with Winterson’s and 
Lacan’s belief in language, and the problems stemmed from it: 解鈴還需繫鈴人, 
“only the one who ties the bell (a metaphor for a problem) can take it off”. In the last 
few decades Winterson has been working out a ways to re-gain our freedom through 
language, the primary prison which confines us. The relation between language and 
reality, hence restriction and desire, and everything as construction, is so intimate 
that I firmly believe that psychoanalysis could help us to (re-)understand and (re-
)produce Winterson, and, on a larger scale, to approach the subject matter of reading, 
understanding literature and translation more profoundly. This is how Lacan comes 
into the picture. Winterson’s writings are structurally and linguistically so complex 
that a linear perception of a coherent meaning is impossible. In order to translate or 
to read, to understand, her work, we will need to find out the meanings of the text—
but whose meanings should we seek? A traditional reading method encourages 
readers to look for the writer’s meaning, the “correct” interpretation of the text, as 
they basically believe that the author has a quasi-theological power similar to God-
as-Creator. (In Chapter 2 I will elaborate on the notion of the Other as Author-God in 
the reader’s intersubjectivity, and compare it with the postmodern notion of the 
Other as Text.) 
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 However, as hinted in the previous sections, it does not sound feasible to 
attain the writer’s meaning, as we can neither penetrate the author’s mind nor access 
the thing-in-itself, the “outside-ness”. It is, and can only be, our psychological (and 
therefore fictional) perception that we bring to the text, our imaginary construction of 
“the author’s mind”; readers can never know anything about writers apart from, or 
without relying on, their own personal perception. This perception is, without doubt, 
constructed, hence restricted, by the reader’s personal background on culture, politics 
and religions. It is never possible to find a writer’s meaning, for it is impossible to 
look for anything not-self, or without going through the self.  
 A writer’s meaning to a reader is, as a result, what the reader presumes as the 
author’s meaning. As the subtitle of this dissertation has hinted, it is always the 
reader’s interpretation of the writer: read my text and tell me who you are. When my 
reader leaves me criticism on my writing, from praise and critical challenge I will be 
able to tell how they interpret the text, in other words, how their mind is at work. For 
instance, in my Facebook status I once criticized the Catholic church for conniving at 
pedophiles’ perverted sexual assault on children, and one of my acquaintances 
interpreted the word “perverted” as homosexual rather than pedophiliac, regardless 
of the existence of the phrase “sexually assaulting young children” in the sentence. 
He wrote back a very long criticism on “my” prejudice against homosexuality, and 
his over-reaction leads to this question in my head—how could I ever predict that my 
reader would interpret “perverted” as homosexual instead of pedophiliac, when I 
have never thought that way? Rather than seeking refuge from my author-ity as an 
author (to claim that I did not mean that), I simply explained to him that a person or 
an object possessing few attributes simultaneously does not equate the attributes to 
one another, and, if he was still unsatisfied with the “answer” (and he was not), he 
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should feel free to interpret my text any way he wants since meanings lie more on 
readers rather than writers. However, I could not help wondering why he, or his 
unconscious, would immediately read the word “perverted” as referring to 
homosexuality, as he is the only acquaintance of mine who did so. This very recent 
incident, unexpected and foolish, nonetheless nudges me to think profoundly about 
the reader’s intersubjectivity in reading ... 
 In the final paragraphs of the Introduction, I would like to briefly demonstrate 
the flow of this paper. This dissertation will start with an investigation on how the 
reader’s intersubjectivity influences the interpretation of texts, through the lens of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis in Chapter 2. I attempt to compare the effects of the author 
as Other on reading intersubjectivity to the effects of the text as Other on reading 
intersubjectivity, and will provide a careful explanation why the differences in the 
two Others do not bring about dramatic differences in the two subjectivities. Then, in 
Chapter 3, I will apply Lacanian psychoanalysis briefly on some of Winterson’s 
published novels. I introduce some key Lacanian concepts, such as objet petit a, 
together with few of Winterson’s complex writings, e.g. The Passion and Art & Lies. 
I attempt to explains the crucial role of objet petit a in repetition and obsession, and 
link it with Winterson’s recurring plot and the obsession to repeat and sacrifice, most 
patently shown in Atlas in Weight.  
 In Chapters 4 and 5, my experimental Chinese translation of brief passages 
from Art & Lies will be provided, following with a detailed explanation on how the  
application of Lacanian theories and their intimate relation with Winterson’s 
obsession (repetition) play their roles in the production as well as interpretation of 
the creative translations. Through my multilayered translation of the beginning 
sentences of the first Sappho chapter, I attempt to demonstrate how a translatum may 
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preserve multiple layers of meanings of the source text, particularly through the 
application of homophones and, most significantly, to show how the target text may 
create new (excessive) meanings to the text through the lens of psychoanalytic and 
critical theories. This ambitious research topic, I believe, may function as a strong 
refutation of the stereotype of translation as loss, or, from another perspective, may 
highlight the intimate relation between loss and excess. 
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2. The Author-God and the Text as the Other on Reading 
(Inter-)Subjectivity 
  
 One major reason for me to have selected Art & Lies as my tentative 
experimental translation target lies in the literary complexity of the novel. The 
Sappho chapters in Art & Lies arguably constitute one of the most complicated and 
intertextual texts of Winterson’s writings. To demonstrate the chapter’s 
translatability, I have selected few specific keywords from the novel to carry out an 
experimental translation. The first few examples are from the beginning sentences of 
the first Sappho chapter, in page 51 of Art & Lies: 
  
I am a Sexualist.  
In flagrante delicto.  
The end-stop of the universe.  
Say my name and you say sex.  
Say my name and you say white sand under a white sky white trammel of 
my thighs.  
 
 It is neither fatuous nor hyperbolic to suggest that the sentences above do not 
convey any coherent messages. Similar to many of Winterson’s skillful writing, this 
very short passage is a conundrum formed by sentence fragments which have no 
obvious connection among each other. But could it be possible that the relation is 
written on the body of the text that it is only visible under a certain light? Apart from 
raising readers’ interest and enjoying the pleasure of playing with language, one 
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reason for writers like Winterson to put down linearly unaccountable ideas, i.e. to 
render their texts as fragments, is that they want the words to function as a barrier 
which rejects external authority—no external authority can be exerted on the 
feminist/feminine text since it is only accountable to its own kind, only interpretable 
by its own language and logic—because when anyone wants to impose masculine 
logic onto women, Woman does not exist. As Lacan has theorized in “God and 
Woman’s jouissance” in Seminar XX: 
  
Woman can only be written with a bar through it. There’s no such thing 
as Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There’s no 
such thing as Woman because, in her essence […] she is not-whole. 
‘Woman’ (la) is a signifier, the crucial property (propre) of which is that 
it is the only one that cannot signify anything, and this is simply because 
it grounds woman’s status in the fact that she is not-whole. That means 
we can’t talk about Woman (La femme).1  (73) 
 
 Women are the excess of and are unaccountable to the Symbolic as well as its 
masculine structure. To read this feminine, i.e. disruptive, text, readers can only refer 
one phrase back to the other, until the fragments collide and clash with one another 
and we hear the echoes. The external authority of the traditional common reader, 
who presumes, and is so confident with his assumption, that texts should follow the 
“normal” structure and grammar and can be perceived linearly is here implicitly 
mocked. The causality between two successive sentences, one of the most basic 
tenets of “normal” writing, has no guarantee in disruptive feminine writings. This 
writing style deprives not only the reader of his external authority over the text but 
also the writer of her “theological” author-ity—even the writer herself cannot limit 
                                                 
1
 In Lacanian psychoanalysis, something only “exists” when it can be fully inscribed in the Symbolic. 
As for something which cannot be completely articulated or categorized by the Symbolic, such as the 
Other’s jouissance which persists in mind as an ideal or fantasy yet does not exist in the reality (since 
it can never be articulated), Lacan uses the vocabulary “ex-sists”, which “persists and makes its claims 
felt with a certain insistence from the outside, as it were”. (Reading Seminar XX 35) 
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the possibility of the text. To put this in a mystic way, human agents do not triumph. 
Fragments do. Text does.  
 There have long been arguments on whether human subjectivity—of authors, 
translators and readers—exists in both writing and rewriting. The answer to this issue 
is, to me personally, extremely clear: no matter how hard some people try to ignore 
human’s involvement in writing (especially religious texts) and translation, it is 
undeniable that, from the Kantian notion, our perception is and will always be 
limited by our senses and our very existence as homo sapiens. The subjectivity of 
authors, rewriters and readers cannot not exist in the interpretation and translation of 
the texts, simply because these kind of intellectual activities must go through our 
mind. Since our perception is restricted by our sense, we can never know anything 
without bias, i.e. without relying on our sense, our mind etc.  
 In Kant’s terms, we may never know “things-in-themselves”. Even for 
concepts like space, time, (the existence of) substance or causality, our experience of 
these kind of a priori concepts is restricted by human sensibility, hence cannot be 
used to measure the “things-in-themselves”. For anything which appears in space and 
time, it only appears when it is sensed by our minds. In other words, there is no 
method to know anything without going through our sensibility. Therefore, the 
“things-in-themselves”, the world as it is in itself, are forever unknowable, since for 
anything to be knowable it must have been processed by our sensibility, i.e. biased. 
In John Locke’s maxim, “[n]othing is in the understanding that was not previously in 
the senses,” including the interpretation of texts.2 
 The subjectivity of the readers, especially before the postmodern and 
poststructural wave, was significantly constructed and influenced by the Author. By 
                                                 
2
 Note that the “senses” in Locke’s phrase is often taken to imply empiricism, which is to say, the 
individual’s sensory contact with reality. I am taking the term here to imply phenomenology, which is 
to say, the individual’s sense-based (but ultimately imaginative) construction of reality. 
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using the word Author with a capital A, I refer to the abstract projection of the 
authors as individuals in the mind of the readers, i.e. the readers’ psychological 
(hence fictional) construction of the generalized author-itative figures of writers. 
This Author, which possesses “theological” superiority and power and is very similar 
to the big Other in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is first commented upon by Barthes in 
his significant essay “The Death of the Author” (1967). When it comes to the term 
“Author” with a capital “A”, we can think of authors as Other on reading 
intersubjectivity from the readers’ point of view. The reason behind this concept is 
that the Author is the readers’ subjective psychological construction in nature, hence 
is considered as the intersubjective Other which is dramatically different from the 
exact individuals of writers or rewriters as subjects. 
 One of the arguments that I have been making since the beginning of this 
dissertation is that human subjectivity always exists in the process of reading, hence 
also of translating. Regardless of the notable celebration of “the removal of the 
Author” (Barthes 145) since the 1970s, an academic movement which prompts the 
autonomy of a text as well as its subjectivity and afterlife (which allows and calls for 
translation), human subjectivity has never been displaced in the study of literature. 
The phenomenon of the emphasis on the Text , no matter how superficially it seems 
to indicate an effacement or denial of human subjectivity, should not be considered 
equivalent to such an effacement. In the era of postmodernism and poststructuralism, 
the single theological author-ity of the Author-God which is “tyrannically centred on 
the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions” (Barthes, 143) simply has his 
role assumed by the Text as the big Other in the form of an impersonalized God—
which is to say that both the Author and the Text are subjective constructs organized 
by the big Other. There is no Author and no Text outside the Other. 
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 Let me be very cautious and move slowly in this argument—here, I am trying 
to compare the effects of the author as Other on reading intersubjectivity to the 
effects of the text as Other on reading intersubjectivity. The interpretation of the 
author as God over the text is the “traditional” reading style, which was an over-
prevalent phenomenon in the history of reading. This “normal” reading style, which 
puts the writer on a pedestal, is still popular nowadays among the majority of non-
specialists who have no expertise in literary studies or humanities. When a reader 
interprets the author as the author-itative God who decides, controls and knows (all 
of) the meaning of the texts, s/he hunts for the author’s meaning by going through 
the writer’s entire literary output, dictionaries, the writer’s interviews and columns or 
other publications, etc., so as to figure out the single correct interpretation of the text. 
The author is, in this case, similar to the omnipotent God who wields such total 
power over the text that if the writer says s/he does not (or, ex post facto, did not) 
intend a certain thing then that interpretation is a wrong and excessive deviation. 
Here, the reader feels awe at the control of the Author, the generalized powerful 
author-itative figure who is supposed to know everything in traditional beliefs on 
reading, i.e. the Author as the Other.  
 However, when the reader encounters the text as Other, she considers the text 
as either an opportunity to transform it into her own (i.e. to encounter herself in the 
finished product of her interpretation) or as a complicated system which instills awe 
in her. In this case, I call this sublime, “automatic” system (which has an afterlife, 
which chases after life) the Text, with a capital T. The Text functions as (another) 
Other of the readers which haunts us as a mystic, abstract, unfathomed energy and 
knowledge with its own life whose multi-dimensional space is totally beyond the 
reader’s imagination. The Text opens up countless opportunity to interpret written 
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texts, but exactly due to this promise of an infinite possibility of interpretation, 
authors and readers can no longer claim to know what we write or read. Our 
linguistic, cultural, political as well as academic background obstructs us from any 
ideal perception of the Text.  
 In the reign of the Author, there is one and only one correct interpretation of 
the texts; any deviations will be punished. But after the Author-God abdicated the 
throne in the Text’s favor, texts can no longer be completely interpreted, as 
explained above, due to the demand of an afterlife and the translatum, i.e. a new and 
never-ending re-presentation which guarantees the unexplored space of the Text. 
This is what Walter Benjamin theorizes as “translatability” in his article “The Task 
of the Translator” (Benjamin Illuminations). In this paper, Benjamin introduces the 
concept of translatability, which governs translation: 
 
Translatability is an essential quality of certain works, which is not to say 
that it is essential that they be translated; it means rather that a specific 
significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability 
[…] Just as the manifestations of life are intimately connected with the 
phenomenon of life without being of importance to it, a translation issues 
from the original—not so much from its life as from its afterlife […] For 
in its afterlife—which could not be called that if it were not a 
transformation and a renewal of something living—the original 
undergoes a change. (71-3) 
 
Benjamin believes that the continuous maturation of the text (through the collection 
of fragments) can lead to “pure language”, which “no single language can attain by 
itself but which is realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each 
other”, and therefore the “eternal life of the works and the perpetual renewal of 
language (74).  
 Therefore, thanks to the domination of the Text, the meanings of texts 
become ambiguous, unlimited and impossible to be fully (re)presented. There is no 
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longer any absolute standard of right and wrong when it comes to text interpretation, 
but only different interpretive layers or approaches. This atmosphere of reading 
skepticism, prevalent after the postmodern and poststructuralist wave, is enticing yet 
double-binding in nature. The thrift of this belief which denies any absolute claims 
may only rest on the basis of an absolute premise—that undetected interpretations 
must exist. For one to claim that these are not the only, or the only small group of, 
correct interpretations of a certain text, one has to make sure that there are potential 
interpretations which are not yet discovered—and this is an absolute premise for 
denying any absolute claims, thus double-binding. This logic is fundamentally very 
similar to the validation of the paradoxical claim “I do not know every/anything.” An 
affirmative preposition “I know I do not know every/anything” is a compulsory 
condition for the absolute skepticism “I do not know every/anything” to function. 
Built on a self-refuting premise, this paradoxical, absolute skepticism of text 
interpretation has put on the mask of Reason but secretly triumphs through the 
underlying mystic elements in its presumption.  
 At this point, it may be surprising that I reach the conclusion that the 
differences in the two Others (Author and Text) do not result in huge differences in 
the two subjectivities. At this moment you might be wondering: don’t we all agree 
that when a reader interprets the author as God over the text, s/he searches for the 
author’s meaning and feels awe at the author’s control; but when a reader encounters 
the text as Other, s/he transforms the text into his/her own interpretation or feels the 
Text instilling awe in him/her, and therefore should render us the primary differences 
between the two Others as my searching for author’s meaning, versus my decision to 
transform meaning into my own? The Author and the Text as Other are, 
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superficially, contradictory to each other; however, it is arguable that to a certain 
extent, the Text is not dramatically different from the Author. 
 To start with, the Text is, very much like the Author, a manifestation of what 
Lacan calls the Other-capital-O, what Žižek renamed the big Other, an abstract 
powerful unconscious force similar to patriotism or God. They do not exist 
ontologically and are “nowhere in reality”, but it would be both shallow and naive to 
suggest that these notions do not exist, for all the wars and murders in history, 
initiated and encouraged by “the Fatherland” or God, can function as excellent 
evidence of their existence. As Žižek has argued in Enjoy Your Symptom! (1992), 
“We cannot explain the very material reality of fights and sufferings without 
reference to it.” Billions and billions of people are willing to sacrifice everything, 
including their property, family and life for the glory of their religion or country, or 
for unconscious forces like freedom which wield tremendous power over us. 
Sacrifice, no matter how selfless and holy it seems, must refer back to the self, which 
is controlled by the big Other. In Chinese, there is an idiom 自編自導自演的戲, “a 
play which is self-written, self-directed and self-acted”, which is arguably one of the 
best definitions of the term “sacrifice”. In another mind-blowing book On Belief 
(2001), Žižek introduces the two common falsities of the concept of sacrifice: the 
first one resides on the underlying presupposition that one may only sacrifice 
something that one possesses, while the second one is that sacrifice rests on the 
notion of exchange, i.e. the subject sacrifices his property, honor, future or life so as 
to gain something back in exchange. In Chapter 3, I will provide a more profound 
investigation of the idea of sacrifice, as well as its relation to repetition, obsession 
and the big Other (pp. 50-68).   
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 To summarize the discussion of the big Other briefly here, it is unwise to 
suggest that patriotism or God does not exist since they leave a huge impact on 
people’s lives, but on the other hand they never exist ontologically. They only exist 
insofar as they are mutually constructed as a kind of intersubjective, collective and 
abstract “power” which has no actual form or body but is nevertheless strong and 
significant enough to construct, shape and restrict the way we see ourselves and the 
world. And, the Author and Text that I discussed previously lie in the exact same 
category with God or the Fatherland, which is “the Other” in Lacan’s terminology. 
The Text is the big Other of contemporary readers, the formless God whose gaze 
rests on us, endlessly criticizing and barring us from every interpretation of the text, 
from our interpretation of the text, by pointing his finger at us and repeating his 
command: “this is not the right one” (because there is no right one to start with). 
Since there is no absolute correct interpretation of any text and there are infinite 
possible interpretations, the Text consequently overtops the human as anOther 
theological figure which forever questions and punishes us for our own 
subjectivity—we, as human beings as well as constructed subjects, are limited in the 
sense that our interpretation of texts is eternally bound by our educational and 
cultural background (hence blinds us to an all-directional interpretation of texts).  
 This is the second reason why I suggested that there is no dramatic difference 
between the subjectivities brought about by the two Others (Author and Text): When 
we think about our personal interpretation of a text and our quest of the search for 
meanings, the transformation of meanings into our own, the vantage point which 
regulates our actions and decisions, comes not from the text, but rather from our past 
English teachers, literature teachers or someone/someplace else. If the Text is the 
(inter)Text(uality) that Kristeva defines in Desire in Language (1969), it is, again, 
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(only) the big Other. This perspective of seeing the Text as Other can explain the 
pleasure of the text theory suggested by Barthes, or, more precisely, can provide the 
Lacanian viewpoint of Barthes’ postmodern reader-response theory. 
  Reading must obviously involve a reader, a person whose perception and 
bias will inevitably influence the re-presentation and the absorption of the messages, 
and this reader will, as Roland Barthes argues in The Pleasure of the Text (1973), 
gain emotional reward in the process of reading. According to Barthes’ theory, a 
passive reader who digests a texte lisible (readerly text) would gain plaisir (pleasure) 
by reading as a subject, while for an active reader who engulfs a texte scriptible 
(writerly text), he would be awarded a more extreme, intense and radical pleasure 
which Barthes termed as “bliss”, and in French, jouissance. By reading actively, i.e. 
with a critical mind which constantly thinks and questions rather than submitting to 
the authority of the author and absorbing everything that one is told, the reader is 
allowed to break out of the subject’s position (for a single split moment).  
 Barthes’ theory of readerly and writerly textuality is reasonable yet not 
Lacanian enough. While agreeing with Barthes’ conclusion that reading a writerly 
text yields jouissance, I intend to argue it from the opposite direction, i.e. that when a 
reader reads a writerly text, s/he never breaks away from the Subject’s position but 
rather occupies the position of the Subject to the purest possible extent.  
 The reason that I suggest a contradistinctive approach to Barthes’ theory is 
that while a reader is reading a readerly text, s/he is learning from the text. Engulfing 
the knowledge and attempting to internalize it into part of her or him, the passive 
reader is constructing the Other which controls him/her and simultaneously s/he is 
shaping the manifestation of the big Other which dominates him/her. In other words, 
while reading a readerly text, the subject is busy building up his/her Other. However, 
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a reader who is reading a writerly text is critically interrogating and commenting (in 
the mind) on the materials that s/he reads. This seems to be very simple, 
straightforward and obvious, but it would appear more complicated once I have 
raised this short but significant question: where does the basis of a critical reader’s 
judgement originate from? There can be hundreds of possible answers to this 
question. It may stem from the parents or teachers whom the reader has come across 
with in the past, those important small others who have constructed and shaped the 
subject, or it may come from an inspiring book from a philosopher, or even (the 
internalized teaching from) a novel, a short story, a soap opera, or a children’s book 
that the subject has been exposed to in childhood. What does this actually mean? All 
these examples which could possibly have constructed and influenced the subject 
imply that while a reader reads actively, s/he is reproducing the voice of the 
(dominate manifestation of) the Other which has long possessed him/her.  
 Here is a concise example: Imagine an uneducated old man raised in a 
financially disadvantaged family in an extremely patriarchal-plus-religious society, 
and a young woman who majors in humanities at university and was raised in a 
society where human rights and freedom of speech are securely protected by law and 
the mutual belief of the people. If we present a piece of a children’s story to these 
two people, who are from very diverse educational and cultural backgrounds, they 
would very likely come up with different, even possibly contradictory, themes and 
morals from the same story, and, needless to say, diverse emotional responses to the 
texts as well.  
 Why do people respond differently, sometimes even contradictorily, in the 
interpretation of meanings and in emotions, to the same piece of text? One of the 
most patent answers is that these people are constructed by different faces of the 
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Other. For instance, a reader who is dominated by the Other-as-child and a reader 
who is dominated by the Other-as-parent would interpret the same piece of text 
differently. As a result, active readers do not solely absorb but also think and 
question critically when they read writerly texts, yet their worldview and the way 
their mind works do not appear from nowhere. Readers, if they are to read critically, 
must be dominated by certain ideologies—mainstream or peripheral, but still and all 
ideologies. This idea of all ideologies as constructions can, again, be linked back to 
Lacan’s later teaching of syndromes: rather than the traditional belief that there is the 
“normal” state and different syndromes, Lacan suggests that “normal” is merely the 
norm of males—hence there are only syndromes. So, when it comes to reading a 
writerly text, readers actively respond to new messages by retrieving the internalized 
teaching of the Other, “normal” or not, which has already dominated them. In other 
words, when critical readers engage in the process of reading, they are reading 
through the angle of the Other, speaking and thinking through the voice of the Other. 
In one sentence, they are reproducing the Other.  
 This is why I argue that readers who read writerly texts are, in 
contradistinction to what Barthes suggests, occupying the position of the Subject in 
its purest sense, which is simultaneously how jouissance comes into play. This 
jouissance, yielded when a critical reader actively reads a writerly text, is the Other’s 
jouissance. The Lacanian Subject enjoys being enjoyed by the Other, enjoys 
functioning as the agent of the Other and enjoys the entire domination by the Other. 
What Barthes calls the pleasure of the text in that sense is, therefore, what Lacan 
calls the jouissance of the Other. However, it is noteworthy that this Other’s 
jouissance is, instead of solely belonging to the big Other, also enjoyed by the 
subject as a participant, an agent, a puppet. It is very crucial for us to realize the 
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subject’s enjoyment, for it casts a positive light on this argument which might easily 
be misunderstood as utterly negative (e.g. the impossibility of liberation). And, as 
argued previously, on pp. 19 of Chapter 1.3, it is precisely because subjects are 
dependent on the Other, which promises hope and change, that fixation is theorized 
as temporary but not eternal. 
 Our discussion of a Lacanian perspective of the pleasure of the text theory 
should probably come to an end. However, I must insist that my argument does not 
mean Barthes is wrong in seeing the reader as breaking away from the position of the 
Subject when s/he reads a writerly text. Breaking from and occupying the position of 
the Subject are two sides of the same coin: Barthes focuses on the extent to which 
jouissance derives from the loss of meaning (and hence subjectivity) and I focus on 
the extent to which jouissance derives from the production of meaning; both occur 
simultaneously in the process of reading.  
 From the delicate investigation and argument provided above, we can see the 
clear relation between the Text and the Other, for the Text is the Other. Hence, it 
would be understandable why human subjectivity always exists in reading, no matter 
whether it is the Text or the Author that dominates the reading activity—both the 
theological Author and the transcendental Text are psychological constructions 
within our mind, therefore subordinated to human subjectivity.  
 I am definitely not the first person who has noticed this phenomenon. 
Another renowned academic who has argued the Text as the Other, though subtly 
and without any reference to Lacan, is Walter Benjamin. Benjamin is one of the 
scholars who is publicly known for his enthusiastic celebration of the Text. In his 
famous article “The Task of the Translator”, Benjamin’s mystic notion of pure 
language and the texts which provide for an afterlife, i.e. translations and (therefore) 
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re-interpretations, are apparently what I call the Text, the psychologically 
constructed “entity”, the mystic “power” which “exists” and only “exists” in 
human’s collective cognition. As Douglas Robinson argues in his unpublished paper, 
“Walter Benjamin and the Deep Ecology of Translatability”, this God-like figure of 
the Text, which has its own autonomy and afterlife, can be understood by the 
ecological conception as a part of social behavior. Taking Benjamin’s “The Task of 
the Translator” as the starting point of his argument, Robinson claims that: 
 
Benjamin is concerned with human agents, at least some of the time—
that his mystified discussions of the mind of God and pure language and 
the rest as superhuman or at least nonhuman agents are a kind of 
metaphorical shorthand for an ecological understanding of human social 
interaction that was available to Benjamin more as a largely inchoate felt 
orientation than it was as a well-articulated (or even articulable) social 
theory. (n.p., italics mine) 
 
 Instead of a truly independent supernatural entity, the all-knowing Text 
(versus the impotent, not-knowing human) is an ideology, constructed and sustained 
by our mutual, collective intersubjectivity which is formed by the impersonalized 
generalization of the small other.
3
 The Text in this case is a mutually recognized and 
approved “fiction” sustained by individuals’ intersubjective beliefs, which is similar 
to a series of other abstract values such as morals, religions and patriotism. Although 
this “fiction” does not exist ontologically anywhere in reality and its existence is 
merely based on its real effects (which are carried out collectively by human beings 
in a community), it nevertheless functions as a mysterious “force” which governs the 
way our society works. This mystic intersubjective entity is, to apply Lacan’s term, 
the big Other which “has a body and does not exist” (Seminar XVII, 66). This big 
Other, as Žižek summarizes in Enjoy Your Symptom!, “possesses no substantial 
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 A more careful explanation of the small other, as well as its relation to the big Other and the 
Subject, is provided in the discussion of Schema L (pp. 66-9). 
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actuality [as] it doesn’t exist as a Platonic world apart, yet neither can it be reduced 
to a nominalistically conceived ‘abbreviation’ for the multitude of individual, really 
existing entities” (52). Nevertheless, the Other dominates and regulates our actual 
lives by functioning as “the locus of truth”, which is, as I argued before, by 
occupying the place of God, as in Lacan’s description in Seminar XX, “the only 
place, albeit an irreducible place, that we can give to the term ‘divine being’ […] 
God (Dieu) is the locus where […] the dieu - the dieur - the dire, is produced. With a 
trifling change, the dire constitutes Dieu” (45). As a result, regardless of the 
superficial diversity, the power shift from the Author-God to the all-knowing Text 
does not make any difference to the involvement of human subjectivity in text 
production and interpretation.  
 “As long as things are said, the God hypothesis will persist” (45).  
 
 Given that human subjectivity is obviously engaged in the process of reading, 
it makes a lot of sense for us to apply psychoanalytic theories to the understanding of 
literature and translation. This is, I believe, an extremely useful and beneficial way to 
approach literary texts. Most literary pieces are structurally, syntactically, and 
semantically challenging for readers. For some complex writing such as the Sappho 
chapter of Winterson’s Art & Lies, it is syntactically impossible to result in a logical 
piece of text if we are to analyze it through a traditional (in other words “masculine”) 
linear interpretive lens. To perceive (and therefore translate) the text in a 
conservative way would only butcher the beautifully crafted text into a monosemous, 
flat-toned narration. If a translator is to rewrite and reproduce the messages, s/he 
must disentangle the semantic/linguistic knots and figure out the multiplicity of 
Winterson’s esoteric writing. Therefore, Winterson’s confounding text “forces” the 
 38 
confused audience to not only understand but also give the text a meaning—but at 
the same time the text refuses external authority (i.e. denies the meaning that the 
reader gives it) as, first, it is almost impossible to interpret the text logically by using 
one single method of reading, and second, no single means of interpretation could 
cover the very high multiplicity of the text embedded in the fragments.  
 Yet, when it comes to a discussion of meanings, we should first ask whether 
the lines constitute a coherent meaning, or, to take a more radical approach, whether 
they constitute any meaning at all, if we are to celebrate the numerous layers of 
meanings of the text. As meanings are, first, based on difference and deferral and, 
second, generated in the reader’s mind (hence mental constitutions), they are much 
more abstract than we suppose them to be. The best way to put it is probably as this, 
that meanings are not non-existent. They are (generated by) the big Other—they do 
not exist ontologically, but it feels as if they do. The double negations are probably 
the nearest to the truth. This is also why a number of scholars have symbolized the 
text as an onion—we cannot say that it does not exist, but to peel the layers off one 
would only find out that there is nothing in the core. However, of course, nothing is 
not necessarily negative. The void is not only part of an onion, but arguably the most 
precious kernel of this vegetable, analogous to the void in Kindle Eggs and the 
indeterminacy of meanings. This emptiness is the essential component, the condition, 
of the existence of the onion-text, while the existence of the text and its meaning is 
paradoxically marked by its non-existence. 
 Since meanings are not as stable and constant as they superficially seem, I 
argue that in order to translate Winterson’s complicated texts we must adopt an 
innovative means of text interpretation. “I am a sexualist. In flagrante delicto. The 
end-stop of the universe” (51). The Sappho chapter of Art & Lies is so semantically 
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and structurally complicated that it creates difficulty of understanding, and hence 
translating, the text in a linear way. There are a few “problems” of interpretation that 
we must solve in order to understand the text—for instance, we must figure out the 
meaning of some ambiguous terms, such as “end-stop” and “universe”, so as to come 
up with some possible meanings for the expression “the end-stop of the universe”. In 
this thesis, I suggest the application of Lacan to the interpretation of the brief 
passages from Art & Lies. The Lacanian interpretation of the text, or, the Lacanian 
perspective of translation, should be able to provide valid and reasonable answers for 
these questions: What are the various possible meanings of “end-stop”? How many 
ways are there to interpret that phrase “the end-stop of the universe”, as well as the 
Medieval Latin expression “in flagrante delicto”? How, if possible, may we preserve 
the numerous layers of meanings of the source text in its Chinese counterpart 
through a heuristic use of Lacan’s theories, or even to create extra meanings to the 
target text? 
 In the next chapter, I will investigate the nature of transgression and provide a 
discussion of repetition, compulsion and sacrifice. Through the Lacanian concept of 
objet a, I attempt to link these notions to Winterson’s recurring writing motifs though 
a brief reference to a few of her published novels, particularly Weigh, The Passion 
and Art & Lies. I want to investigate the nature of transgression, for Winterson’s 
innovative use of some established technical terms (e.g. end-stop) can, to a certain 
extent, be thought of as a kind of “coinage”, which is against the “normal” way of 
using languages and therefore transgression. And, in Chapters 4-5, I will go into my 
experimental Chinese translation of Art & Lies, whose emergence and interpretation 
cannot be separated from Lacanian theories and one of Winterson’s recursive writing 
motifs, obsession. 
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3. The Compulsion to Repeat and Sacrifice: Jeanette 
Winterson and Atlas 
 
3.1 Transgression 
 
 Language, the Symbolic. Grammatical rules are similar to the Law, guarding 
the way meanings and logic works. Disturbance in the established system is 
discouraged; improper challenge to the power of the Father is disapproved. However, 
wherever oppression exists so too does repulsion. There is always a small group of 
“liberated” people, “liberated” in quotation marks for they are free from the 
dominating syndrome only, who would react, respond and rebound when they are 
repressed. To escape from restrictions they break the rules, cast their steps over the 
bottom lines—while the boundary, without doubt, progresses with them at the same 
time.  
 Similar to the actual entity and the shadow, one never moves without setting 
the other into motion. The transgression leads to inevitable failure since at the exact 
moment that one steps beyond the Symbolic, the Symbolic surrounds and engulfs the 
“extra” immediately since the ability to be articulated through signifiers, or imagined 
as images, has already rendered the transgression into something proper. This is, as 
always, a tamed transgression—you transgress, and at the exact same split single 
moment you tame it. The Other tames it. Transgression never carries the essence of a 
real transgression as the definition of a transgression is the impossibility to 
transgress. Do I contradict myself? No, definitely no. Transgression, in an abstract 
(post)structural(ist) conception, can never transgress because when something 
beyond signification is suddenly made or turned articulable, the articulated “thing” is 
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not the previous “something” anymore.4 Whenever one tries to re-present something 
by a signifier, a painting, or any other concrete signs, symbols, sounds or strokes, 
that “something” is not the represented “thing” anymore. Representation is, patently 
implied from the spelling, a re-presentation. To re-present something is, therefore, to 
re-mark—again, re-mark is another interestingly complex word which implies 
something paradoxical from its spelling. A remark seems to be a supplementary 
element of a text, but the term “remark” is a re-mark: remarks mark the text again, 
mark on the text, rewrite the text, and therefore re-present the text. It is a supplement 
which takes over the centre, and is therefore similar to the concept of a 
representation. The re-presentation of something transgressive, as suggested above, 
will inevitably alter the “something” and cast a different light on it when 
articulated/signified. This is why Lacan believes that the truth can only be half-said, 
“le mi-dire de la vérite”. For any transgression, as long as it is articulable, it can 
never transgress. This is why I said the definition of a transgression is the 
impossibility to transgress, because definition is signification, and signification is a 
sheer re-presentation which can never completely refer to the actual transgression.  
 This can be reflected by new semantic meanings granted to old words, new 
coinages or creative sentence structures in languages. They are transgressive when 
they are first created, but isn’t it that the discourse sometimes engulfs new meanings 
or coinages into its long-established corpus or linguistic system, so that the speakers 
of that language can use the new lexis as a meaningful term, which especially stands 
for something that doesn’t exist or doesn’t mean in the first place? Our realm of 
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 However, it is noteworthy that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to argue that 
transgression does exist since we may feel ourselves transgressing. Again, this feeling of transgression 
is similar to other unconscious forces such as patriotism, or the loyalty to an unseen, unheard and 
unproved god. These “forces” do not exist ontologically like gravity, yet they nonetheless speak, 
construct and constrain us. The feeling of transgression relates to guilt, morality, social norms and the 
Freudian superego, the gaze which constantly monitors us and judges us for our every single thought 
and action, and therefore ultimately the big Other. From a certain point of view, there can be no 
transgression when there is no big Other. 
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knowledge and perception is dominated by the King Zhou (紂王) of languages, the 
abusive king of the Symbolic—this is the hegemony of languages.5 For everything 
articulable it cannot transgress in the Symbolic. 
 Let us think of the phrase “Brokeback Mountain”, which did not carry any 
semantic meaning, nor even have any connotation of male homosexuality, before the 
publication of Annie Proulx’s short story in 1997. How about the term “netizen”, 
which did not exist before the emergence of the internet? These words did not exist 
at the beginning, hence were transgression when they were first created and used, but 
aren’t both terms considered quite common, and proper, uses of the English language 
now? Their meanings and implications are not capricious, for no formal dictionaries 
would provide dramatically different elaborations of the use and the meaning of 
these two terms. 
 A never-before-existing vocabulary, a new coinage, a peripheral term, was 
created—and very quickly it was assimilated and included by the centre. It is not 
only netizen or Brokeback Mountain. It’s every single new word. Or, more precisely, 
it is every single word. Netizen and Brokeback Mountain did not exist at the 
beginning, but the same is true of every other vocabulary item that we use. 
Languages do not stem from nothing, and they do change according to time. Which 
word was not arbitrary in the first place? Even for one of the most simple words, 
“you”, it was “thou” in medieval English. If we attempt to approach the matter of 
transgression and arbitrariness from this perspective, then all words and languages 
are transgressive in nature. However, that way would not leave us a fruitful 
conclusion. Rather than labeling all signifiers as transgressive (or not transgressive), 
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 This Chinese term is related to my creative translation of Art & Lies. Detailed explanation on the 
cultural background of this king and its relation to the hegemony of languages is provided at Chapter 
4.2. 
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I prefer taking both sides at the same time. New words were transgressions because 
they were never part of the established language, yet, on the other hand, they are not 
transgression because whenever they exist, they are inscribed by languages, 
signified, verbalized, articulated—by signifiers. By symbols. By sounds. By signs. 
By the Symbolic.  
 In other words, every transgression is a tamed transgression for what is 
articulated is not what it was, yet simultaneously every signifier, or every system of 
classification, can function as a means of transgression. Since the truth can only be 
half-said, there is always the unspoken half, the un-represented surplus, which Lacan 
categorizes as what we call the Real. The Real never stops haunting us as Subjects, 
for it is the remainder of signification. If the Symbolic is light (articulable, 
decipherable and interpretable), then the Real is the shadow that always follows the 
light. Transgression and propriety are therefore also similar to shadow and the actual 
entity—one never exists without the other. This is why even proper names and 
gender, the most fundamental constituents of a symbolic identity, are rebellious in 
nature (See Chapter 5 for details). To put this in Lacanian terms, transgression never 
exists but ex-sists. 
  If we are to look at the term “end-stop”, a specific term used in prosody for 
a grammatical pause at the end of a line of verse, it has no coherent meaning with 
illicit sexual behaviors or any universe. To interpret Winterson’s text, we should 
generate other meanings for this word in order to interpret the text smoothly, and in 
order to do this we will have to treat “end-stop” as a “coinage”—in this dissertation, 
I use the word “coinage” to refer to not only newly coined vocabulary but also old 
terms used with new semantic meanings. 
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 Formed by the two very easy single-syllable units of English vocabulary, 
“end” and “stop”, the “coinage” (again in quotation marks, for there is an established 
meaning of this term, yet it is insufficient for the understanding and translation of the 
Sappho section in Art & Lies) does not seem too bizarre as the creation of coinages is 
not uncommon in literary writings. Some coinages, originally created to enhance the 
complexity of the texts or, similar to the word “netizen”, which is molded from the 
existing words “net” and “citizen,” following the established etymological rule (a 
citizen is a person who lives and participates in the city, and hence a netizen is 
someone who “lives” and participates in the net, having the internet as a metaphor of 
a concrete space), are generated to fulfill the need of having new reference to certain 
specific new concepts or items. Although many of these new words turn out enter a 
wider discourse and become part of our daily usage of language, they are 
fundamentally a disruption of the established “masculine” (for Lacan “fatherly”) 
Symbolic network. 
 Coinages are rebellious. It is difficult to tolerate coinages because they are 
alien terms constituted by the existing, familiar linguistic blocks; even harder to 
endure if they are “coinages” like “end-stop”, which are established vocabulary but 
adopted as if new words that the old semantic meanings are not suffice for the 
readers to understand the text, because this is the “wrong” use of the term, or an 
“improper”, “arbitrary” and “perverted” way to use it. Coinages are the bizarre, 
uncanny constructions built up from the intimate puzzle pieces that we get habitually 
used to. If translation is transgression, a translation which includes new coinages 
transgresses to an even greater extent because it generates foreign vocabulary, which 
steps beyond the proper symbolic rules that we are confined in.  
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 When it comes to “coinages”, especially when they are old words with new 
semantic meanings (e.g. “end-stop”), people tend to develop a kind of anxiety, 
suspicion or even repulsion to them. They would often question the legitimacy of the 
new terms, and sometimes would even hate them with a passion. It is not difficult to 
understand that some people may get dramatically agitated by transgression, because 
it is “incorrect” to violate the norms, but what lies beneath it, the core of their 
contempt, wrath or disgust, is that the “coinages” highlight the paradox of the nature 
of languages: the feeling of “coinages” as deviation emphasizes the legitimacy of our 
“natural” use of languages, yet simultaneously draws the attention to the 
unexplainable legitimacy of our correct use of languages. They draw the attention to 
the naturalness as well as the arbitrariness of the norm, the Law, for naturalness and 
arbitrariness are two sides of the same coin. This is the secret which should never be 
articulated, and people often feel a deadly repulsion (or attraction, depending on 
which one is stronger) to “coinages” or any other props which point out this secret—
that the big Other is inconsistent, constructed by humans and dead—and Subjects are 
willing to sacrifice themselves to cover up the impotence of the big Other.  
 The emergence of new coinages, or any other kind of “transgression” such as 
the use of homonyms and homophones (e.g. the wrong spelling of “there” as “their”, 
or 姓名 as 性明), leads to the feeling of awkwardness that we would, nine times 
out of ten, immediately know and feel is wrong. In other words, we may usually feel 
the arbitrariness of that new/wrong word, which simultaneously signifies the feeling 
of naturalness of our native language—that, for instance, “姓名 ” is “right” 
vocabulary for “name”, it is “the way things are”. As a result, when a coinage feels 
like transgression, it, on the other hand, emphasizes phenomenologically the 
naturalness rather than the arbitrariness of language, and it is because of the 
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existence of the naturalness (the “norm” of using a certain language) that we feel the 
bizarreness of the new coinages. This feeling of awkwardness, generated from the 
transgression which ultimately confirms rather than challenges the norm of the use 
and the construction of language, is probably one of the nearest experiences of the 
inconsistency of the Symbolic that we may have. Although Lacan, working from 
Saussurean structuralism, suggests that the Symbolic itself is inconsistent, this very 
logical conclusion—that all Symbolic constructions are created by human beings, 
and therefore can never be perfect; there is no reason why “dog” should refer to a 
dog rather than a cat—seems to be impossible to be put under experiment in the 
sense that we as subjects may not phenomenologically experience this arbitrariness 
of language, for language is the condition of the unconscious and is the language of 
the Other; what language can do, at most, is to let the subject experience, for 
instance, the arbitrariness of a new coinage or any other kind of transgression, but the 
most basic language must be at work for us to notice those arbitrariness.  
     Or, another scenario that we could come across with the arbitrariness of 
languages is the moment that our norms get challenged. For example, a traditional 
reader could actually say Winterson’s use of “end-stop” is wrong or invalid, because 
“end-stop” has an established semantic meaning in prosody—yet, if another reader 
who is more exposed to the postmodern and the poststructuralist means of thinking 
asks the traditionalist why “end-stop” should mean what it means in prosody, the 
latter could not provide any reason apart from it is the way things are, the norm, the 
rules, and would highly get extremely annoyed by the “lunatic” thinker who 
questions the majority. The traditional reader would be agitated, not because he is 
correct but precisely because he cannot justify why he is correct—people frequently 
feel an extreme repulsion to transgression, not (solely) because transgression is 
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“wrong” but most crucially because they cannot justify why transgression is wrong. 
If we try to think about it, people tend to get much less agitated when it comes to a 
matter of “facts”, but get far much more annoyed when they come across with 
disagreements in more abstract ideas such as morality or social norms. However, no 
matter how “liberated” one is, there are still some certain kinds of norms that one 
would submit to, for Subjects may never totally abandon the Other—they are just 
spoken by the different manifestations of the Other—and therefore there is still and 
always some certain degree of “naturalness” in any critical thinker’s mind. 
 In other words, we as subjects may never directly feel the arbitrariness of 
language, and this is another way to explain why we are always biased—when it 
comes to the way our minds work, we may never escape from the inherently 
inconsistent Symbolic constructions. The arbitrariness of the Symbolic, in this sense, 
is similar to the Lacanian subject, in that the solid existence of the two of them are 
impossible to be put under any test. However, this does not make Lacanian 
psychoanalysis less reliable or plausible, for art does not require scientific proofs like 
experimental data, as numbers only dissect art. The proven “facts” that we encounter 
in scientific experiments are, again, within the Symbolic reality, thus restricted by 
human subjectivity. As Lacan has repeated in his seminars, the truth can only be half 
said, as there is always a residue haunting the articulated Symbolic realm. 
 As for the analytical-philosophical perspective on gender, masculinity and 
femininity have more to do with the structural and thinking patterns—construction 
and destruction—rather than the actual men or women. Therefore, if we are to 
approach the subject matter of coinages from this angle, the act of creating coinages 
is theoretically a feminine act, as it disrupts the masculine Symbolic order—again, 
femininity as a disruptive thinking pattern rather than being like an actual woman. 
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There are at least two significant reasons why thinking femininely in this argument 
does not and cannot equal to thinking like a woman. The first reason is that an actual 
woman can be voiced over by patriarchal or feminist ideologies which make the 
woman not “feminine” enough: there are women as patriarchal agents and women as 
feminists, and they cannot both be “feminine”, regardless of our definition of 
“feminine” as either “submissive and weak” or “thinking and acting out of the well-
being of women”. In other words, the phrase acting or thinking “like a woman” can 
be extremely ambiguous, because it is impossible to define what quality a woman 
should possess in order to be “woman enough” or “woman-like”, without going 
through biased ideologies. Second, for an actual woman to think and speak she has to 
submit to the Symbolic order and let the Other speak her, which is therefore spoken 
through by something masculine (for gender as metaphors). In other words, the 
femininity in transgression stems from the disruption of an established system or 
norm, hence creating new coinages or engaging in any other form of transgression 
refers to thinking, writing or acting disruptively, which does not make a person more 
“like a woman”. Actual women are, similar to men, also controlled and constructed 
by lots of (masculine) ideologies.  
 Transgressions challenge the masculine Symbolic order of languages as well 
as of (the worship of) reason. Norms are a mutually-approved arbitrariness. The 
“proper” way of structuring a sentence is merely the most common way of language 
speakers have of doing so. Behind the absolute rules, there is nothing more to prop it 
up. There is no necessary reason why Reason is the way it is now.  
 After the moment that coinages and their comrades highlight and challenge 
the arbitrariness of the Symbolic order, its authority becomes hilarious. The creation 
of coinages by combining two existing vocabulary items is one of the most severe 
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assaults on the inconsistent Symbolic order, since it is an unknown generated by two 
knowns, by, in our case, “end” and “stop”, two extremely simple monosyllabic 
English vocabulary items whose usage we have mastered since childhood. The 
emergence of an unknown from two unknowns is acceptable; the production of an 
unknown from the combination of one known and one unknown is understandable. 
However, it is much harder to accept an uninterpretable result generated by two well-
known and well-established linguistic elements, because a certain degree of 
uncanniness lies in there. As the worst assault among the three, coinages generated 
by the combination of two standard vocabulary mock the inconsistent and arbitrary 
Symbolic order. If the masculine homage to Reason and the Symbolic is a kind of 
idolatry, the production of new coinages and “coinages”,  the repurposing of an 
established technical term, is iconoclastic.  
 
 
3.2 Repetition, the Beginning and the (Excess) Void in Limitation 
 
 Jeanette Winterson is somehow obsessed with the interrogation of boundary 
and desire. Her love and hatred of limitation is beyond the imagination of her general 
readers that they are merely represented by one or two of her novels that have 
boundaries as the obvious writing motif, such as Weight. If we approach her oeuvre 
with a critical eye, it is not difficult to notice that Winterson never ceases retreating 
to these subject matters, as if forced to repeat the same quest through different 
characters’ names, settings and narrative strategies. In her 2005 novel Weight, 
Winterson confessed her uncontrollable addiction to questioning the essence of limits 
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and boundaries, which are apparent to “any fool […] that these things were only 
rules and taboos—customs made to keep people in their place” (104): 
 
I chose this story above all others because it’s a story I’m struggling to 
end. Here we are, with all the pieces in place and the final moment 
waiting. I reach this moment, not once, many times, have been reaching 
it all my life, it seems, and I find there is no resolution. I want to tell the 
story again […] I return to problems I can’t solve, not because I’m an 
idiot, but because the real problems can’t be solved. (137) 
 
There is no exaggeration in suggesting that Winterson has the compulsory obsession 
of returning to limitation.  She loathes it, but simultaneously as a subject Winterson 
enjoys and desires it. She keeps on telling the same recurring story of restriction and 
desire while she is, as symbolized by Atlas, “[f]orever to be the same person[, 
f]orever to perform the same task,” (69) because the process of perverted repetition 
yields Winterson jouissance as a subject. 
 Unexpectedly for most “normal” people, obsession is a choice. “The ancients 
believed in Fate because they recognized how hard it is for anyone to change 
anything” (Weight 99). We love to push the responsibility over to Fate since “the 
burden is intolerable”. An enormous amount of energy and effort is required in order 
to break the gravitational pull of the past and the future—Atlas persuaded himself 
that there is no choice. He deceived himself that no man can escape his fate. 
However at the moment that he picked up the golden apples for Heracles, he was 
shown the truth—he could have chosen differently, but he did not. He is, just like 
Winterson, “always leaning on the limit of [him]self” and can never get beyond the 
limitations because he never wants to. This is proved at the end of the story: when 
Atlas lets his hands go and puts down the earth with the monstrous weight, 
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NOTHING happens. And there was no burden and with Laika the dog he walked 
away (Weight 150-51). 
 It is noteworthy that Winterson repeats the consequence of Atlas putting 
down the world for three times on one page: 
 
 “Nothing happened”.  
 “Nothing happened”.  
 “Write it more substantially—NOTHING”.  
 
 What exactly has happened to Atlas at the end of the story, and how are we 
supposed to understand this ending with Winterson’s own quest to explore 
boundaries and desire? To answer the first question let us read the three sentences 
very carefully: in the third representation of the consequence, the word “nothing” is 
not only put in both italics and capital letters in order to give emphasis to it, but also 
Winterson put down the word “substantially”—what does that mean? It refers to 
Nothing as an entity, the sister of Nobody in Through the Looking-Glass (2000), a 
sequel of the popular children’s literature story Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 
Lewis Carroll has wittily presented a language play on linguistic categories: by 
understanding the quantifier “nobody” in Alice’s “I see nobody on the road” as a 
proper name which refers to an actual person, the King exclaimed in amazement and 
replied “I only wish I had such eyes [… t]o be able to see Nobody!” (196) 
 In the final chapter of Weight, Winterson has put down the consequence of 
Atlas rebelling against from his fate very clearly: this is a substantial manifestation 
of the result of his transgression—NOTHING, as something, happened. This 
Nothing has prohibited the cycle of repetition from recurring endlessly. It puts a stop 
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to Atlas’ compulsion to sacrifice and enjoy—both occur simultaneously since he 
yields jouissance from the never-stopping process of grief and suffering. The 
masochistic impulse to seek the excessive pleasure through suffering. The death-
drive. But Winterson did not write a full stop for her own story. Unlike Atlas, she did 
not put a prohibition on her quest on pain and jouissance, as literally implicated by 
the name of the last chapter of Weight: “I want to tell the story again”. 
 Atlas’ story is Winterson’s story. Although Weight is not an autobiography, it 
nonetheless contains authenticity as “there is always exposure, vulnerability, in the 
writing process, which is not to say it is either confessional or memoir. Simply, it is 
real” (xv). Atlas’ obsession to sacrifice and enjoy is, undoubtedly, Winterson’s 
compulsion to repeat the myth. Suffering from the same fate, both of them attempt to 
seek an excessive pleasure, or, in the more accurate and technical term from 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, jouissance, throughout the process of repetition.  
 Repetition is painful and perverse because it brings a surplus pleasure. As 
theorized by Lacan, the subject’s desire of repetition is based on a chase after the 
objet petit a, the cause of desire which illusionarily appears in the objects of desire 
but is never graspable for human subjects. In Žižek’s terms, objet a is an inherent 
impediment which “prevents the circle of pleasure from closing [and thereby] 
introduces an irreducible displeasure”. The psychic apparatus “finds a sort of 
perverse pleasure in this displeasure itself, in the never-ending, repeated circulation 
around the unattainable, always missed object” and this “pleasure in pain” is what 
Lacan refers to as jouissance, the French for “enjoyment” which has a (lethal) sexual 
connotation (Enjoy 48). For the intimate relation between death and sexual orgasm is 
clearly reflected by the French term la petit mort, the little death, a French 
euphemism for “sexual orgasm”. A similar relation is also observed in Chinese 
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culture: we have the idiom 欲仙欲死, which indicates sexual ecstasy by comparing 
sexual orgasm to divinity and death. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, sexual behavior is a 
process which leads to jouissance—the subject shifts from desire to the domain of 
drive through the rhythmic enjoyment of being, and at the moment that the subject 
yields jouissance, he escapes partly from the Symbolic (from having the object of 
desire to being the object of desire), and this can been seen as an ephemeral 
effacement, i.e. death, of the subject.  
 We need to talk about the Chinese translation of Jeanette Winterson, or the 
general subject matter of translation, with repetition because to translate is to repeat 
(the source text), and we may argue that both translation and repetition are, from a 
certain extent, derived from objet a. It is crucial to remember that objet a is nothing 
but an entropy. In Enjoy Your Symptom!, Žižek has theorized objet a as “nothing but 
a certain curvature of the space itself” when he explains the Freudian drive: “The 
space of the drive is such a paradoxical, curved space: the objet a is not a positive 
entity existing in space, it is ultimately nothing but a certain curvature of the space 
itself which causes us to make a bend precisely when we want to get directly at the 
subject.” Anyone who “possesses” objet a, for example, the lady in the courtly love 
tradition, is “nothing at all, a pure semblance which just materializes the curvature of 
the space of desire” (49). This leads to an interesting deduction that it is the 
emptiness which makes objet a useful (i.e. functional)—since the Symbolic which 
governs the “reality”, e.g. all Symbolic fictions, including the Text, is itself a 
negative, bodiless entity. And given that “to translate” in Chinese is 翻譯 (fānyì), 
with the first character 翻 meaning “to turn over”, we may again think of translation 
as a means to repeat (the source text) in order to chase after the excessive pleasure 
from interrogating the never achievable objet a. 
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 In Seminar XX, Lacan explains how language relates to the never-fulfillable 
desire. In his comment on this expression of the relation between the signifier and 
the signified, S/s, and the phallus, he equates the phallus with the bar between S and 
s, because that barrier implies “a great deal of slippage between what I say I want in 
words or tell myself I want and the actual object I aim at.” This slippage is what has 
set desire at work—desire can never be fulfilled because “[d]esire’s object will not 
sit still; desire always sets off in search of something else. Since desire is articulated, 
made of the stuff of language—at least this is Lacan’s contention, his certainly not 
being a naturalistic notion of desire—it has a very tough time designating any kind of 
exact signified or meaning, pinning something down” (Fink 37). In other words, the 
satisfaction of desire (which Lacan labels as the “phallic jouissance” since this 
pleasure always fails to satisfy, while “phallic” is the synonym of “fallible”) is 
always disappointing because the articulation of desire is always intruded by 
language, and the nature of it (i.e. signification) marks its fallibility. 
 When the Subject is barred (i.e. castrated), das Ding (the Thing) is generated. 
As the most intimate but simultaneously alien object, as central to but also exterior to 
the Symbolic order, the Thing (and objet a) is, once manifested, never able to 
“return” to Lacanian subjects and form the impossible imaginary fullness with the 
mOther. Patients who suffer from obsession unconsciously desire to regain the 
Thing, in which is manifested mostly the compulsion to enjoy and the compulsion to 
sacrifice. As suggested before, repetition is a kind of obsession, and Winterson 
retells the exact same story of the interrogation of boundaries because she is 
obsessed with the pain in the structure of the cycle; she perversely enjoys returning 
to the problem not because she is an idiot but not because the real problems cannot 
be solved either—it is because she does not want the problem to be solved. It is only 
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when the problem is never solved that subject can always come back to work on the 
problem. This is the only means to ensure “the valuable, fabulous thing” is still there 
waiting for her to chase after and gamble for.  
 
We are not always conscious of it, not always aware of what it is we hide 
from prying eyes or that those prying eyes may sometimes be our own 
[…] Gambling is not a vice, it is an expression of our humanness […] 
The hardship is a man-made device because man cannot exist without 
passion. Religion is somewhere between fear and sex. (The Passion 73-
94) 
 
This is her religion. This is her passion. “Passion out of passion’s obstacles” (71). I 
said she loathes and loves boundaries, for Law is desire. In Chapter 2 of On Belief, 
Žižek elaborates on Lacan’s teaching on limitations and desire: the Symbolic Law 
“only elevates into a prohibition the quasi-natural obstacle to the full satisfaction of 
desire” for “it is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance—it 
simply makes a barred subject out of an almost natural barrier” (Écrits 696). As a 
result, the true Law or prohibition is theorized by Žižek as not imposed by external 
agency such as virtue or reason but by desire itself. This is Winterson’s obsession to 
repeat. “To avoid discovery I stay on the run. To discover things for myself I stay on 
the run” (The PowerBook 3). She must keep telling the same story, as she yields 
jouissance through writing and never finishing the one story—so that she can tell the 
same story again. As a result, her novels are personal story books which were not 
created to impress any potential readers: women, intellectuals, homosexuals, anti-
Christians; she wrote them for and to herself, because there is a real problem that she 
wants and does not want to solve. It is through the compulsory repetition that 
Winterson manifests her subjectivity, that her action is her subjectivity and solving 
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the problem of limitation is to deprive her of her subjectivity. As she has put it in the 
introduction to Weight,  
 
Choice of subject, like choice of lover, is an intimate decision. Decision, 
the moment of saying yes, is prompted by something deeper; recognition 
[… T]hese returns, begin the unconscious connection with the subject, an 
unconscious connection that waits for an ordinary moment of daylight to 
show its face. When I was asked to choose a myth to write about, I 
realized that I had chosen already. The story of Atlas holding up the 
world was in my mind before the telephone call had ended […] Re-
written. The recurring language motif of Weight is ‘I want to tell the 
story again’. (XIV, italic mine) 
 
This is not her choice as a subject. This is a choice made by her unconscious so that 
she could be a subject. If anything has chosen the myth of Atlas, it is the big Other. 
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4. The Hegemony of Language, the Void and the Forbidden 
Fruit: Objet a, the big Other and Repetition 
 
  Through the referencing of a number of Winterson’s novels in Chapter 3, I 
have  briefly explained the Lacanian concept of objet petit a and have demonstrated 
its crucial role in repetition as well as obsession. Now, in this chapter and the next, I 
will provide my experimental Chinese translation of the first three sentences in the 
first Sappho chapter in Art & Lies, and attempt to explain my translation through the 
application of Lacanian theories, and their intimate relation with Winterson’s 
obsession to repeat the interrogation of boundaries.  
 I have translated the first three sentences of the Sappho chapter thus: 
 
 I am a sexualist.    私是聖論者。 
 In flagrante delicto.    偷食果時被人捉到。 
 The end-stop of the universe.  語紂的沒端。 
 
  Although a translator could translate the most patent meaning of a 
polysemous vocabulary and list the rest of possible interpretations in footnotes, as if 
they were optional, one of the very important and special features of literary pieces is 
that they usually leave a significant ground of freedom for readers to invent, 
interrogate and interact with the meanings of the work, and coinages definitely play a 
vital role in this perspective.  
 In my experimental translation, I attempt to demonstrate a means to not only 
preserve the numerous layers of meanings of polysemous terms like “end-stop” and 
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“universe”, but even provide some additional (in other words, “excessive”) meanings 
to them through the application of “coinages” and homophones. My experimental 
Chinese translation contains both Cantonese and Mandarin pronunciations as well as 
sentence structures, while one of the Chinese characters, 私 (self; private), is even 
considered from the Japanese perspective as a kanji, the pronoun of “I”, written as 
わたし (pronounced “watashi,” means “I” in Japanese) in Hiragana.  
    As explained clearly in the introduction, this dissertation is written based 
on the foremost objective of the production and interpretation of an interesting, 
creative and complex translation. The project is, again, not an attempt to search for 
the “best” or the “correct” way to translate Winterson into Chinese, or any literary 
texts into any language, according to traditional translation norms, for the 
reproduction of the most patent meanings of individual sentences is not a translation 
means which promises a significant ground or new avenue of intellectual inquiry, 
especially when it comes to the investigation of human subjectivity and translation. 
This thesis takes a heuristic rather than a correctness-based approach to translation 
(and to the application of Lacanian psychoanalysis), and therefore the whole 
argument is devoted to the exploration of a creative multiple-layered target text, from 
which we may think more profoundly about some important Lacanian concepts (such 
as the restriction of languages, the void, the phallus etc.), rather than the “best” or 
“most defensible” way to translate Winterson into Chinese. In other words, I am not 
attempting to translate Winterson “correctly”—as I’ve suggested, correctness is 
based on traditional translation norms, the metempsychotic aspect—or to apply 
Lacan in a dogmatic, systematic or programmatic way.  
 To begin our discussion of the experimental translation, I would like to look 
at the third sentence 語紂的沒端 first, and then go back to the second and the first 
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ones, since these two sentences contain tricky syntax, for instance the Cantonese 
phrase 偷食果時被人捉到, as well as the interesting use of the kanji 私. After a 
thorough discussion of these three phrases, I will look into the term 性明 in Chapter 
5, my experimental translation of “name” from the fourth and the fifth sentences of 
the Sappho chapter.  
 
 
4.1 The end-stop 
 
 Let us start with the third sentence, 語紂的沒端. Before providing an 
explanation for my experimental translation, I would like to look carefully into the 
term “end-stop” in “the end-stop of the universe”. As mentioned in the early part of 
the thesis, “end-stop” is a prosodic term which refers to the grammatical pauses at 
the end of a line of verse. In poetry, a long sentence is often split into two lines 
labelled as “run-on (sentences)”, and if we consider the universe as a line of poetry, 
“the end-stop of the universe” can actually mean the ongoingness of the universe, 
with the run-on sentences in poetry as a model of endlessness—even when there is 
an end-stop at the end of a line, nonetheless the poem continues. On the other hand, 
the universe as a line of poetry could also suggest the analogy between the literary 
text and the world, the intimately intertwined relation between truth and fiction, 
which again collides with Winterson’s recurring motif of questioning the authenticity 
of truth in the manifestation of science and history, and hence can also be linked to 
Lacan’s perception of self and Other (which are again superficially contradictory but 
fundamentally intertwined). However, this “standardized” meaning of “end-stop” is 
somehow insufficient and incomplete—the term “end-stop” patently can be 
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interpreted as more layers of meanings, if we are to consider it as a “coinage” formed 
by “end” and “stop” separately (rather than “end-stop” as one vocabulary). 
Combined by these two very easy monosyllabic English vocabulary items, “end-
stop” should carry at least three plausible meanings.  
 Since the former term in this “coinage” is “end”, the first possible 
interpretation is a spatial limitation. The end-stop of the universe can, therefore, 
stand for the geographical boundary of the universe. The second possible 
interpretation is a temporal limitation, a stop. This temporal restriction of the 
universe can be temporary or permanent, though it is relatively difficult to imagine a 
permanent stop of the universe. But there is something which would never revive 
after a stop, such as a heartbeat (doctors do restart stopped heart beats, but that’s 
artificial—the heart itself can’t start back up!). So, a permanent stop of the universe 
could therefore be understood as the death of the universe, or, of course, an 
ephemeral halt of the universe. The third very possible, but relatively less direct 
meaning of the term “end-stop” is the beginning, or the continuity after the temporal 
impediment, the stop, because ”end-stop” can be interpreted as “to end the stop”. 
From this perspective, the end-stop of the universe is the beginning or, more 
precisely, the continuity of the universe which therefore can be linked to the power 
of birth or growth, which is 生 in Chinese. This character 生 (birth) is the essential 
part of the constitution of the character 性 (sex) since there is a direct relation 
between growth and reproduction (often implied in ancient Chinese texts including 
the Daodejing), and this can function as a valid linkage between the “end-stop” and 
in flagrante delicto. 
 The three (among the) possible meanings of the polysemous term “end-stop” 
demonstrate the self-contradiction in this vocabulary: “end-stop” stands for an 
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extremity, limitation and death yet simultaneously implies the emergence and 
continuity. The paradoxical nature of the coinage is a mark of ambivalence in 
Winterson’s writing, which emphasizes the ever-changing and arbitrary nature of the 
world of words. This ambiguity in “end-stop” becomes a huge challenge to 
translators. To preserve the multiplicity of coinages, I propose to create a similar 
coinage in the target language, in this case, Chinese. The major reason that I am 
against a metempsychotic translation (of the most obvious layer of meaning of the 
text) is that the method of rendering a coinage into the most obvious meaning and jot 
down the rest of the numerous possibilities down as footnote is a horrible way to 
butcher a piece of literature (by which we would generate an insipid, flat-toned 
monosemous narration). The multiplicity and paradox in “end-stop”, or any other 
new coinages created by writers, is the core of the newly made words, such that if 
multiplicity is leached from the text, the essence of coinages would be lost. 
 As a result, we must encounter the difficulty of translating a polysemy into 
another language system, the more complex the vocabulary the more tricky it will be. 
There is a question embodied in most translators’ mind, which is how it is possible to 
preserve, if not all, as many plausible layers of meanings as possible in the target 
text. It is true that we cannot preserve all possible meanings for all words and phrases 
when we attempt to render them into another linguistic and cultural system, but we 
do not necessarily have to retreat to the stereotype of “translation as loss” as an over-
simplified excuse to this phenomenon. 
 There are, without doubt, many possible explanations of why equivalent 
translation is impossible. Cultural backgrounds and connotations are one of the very 
obvious reasons, while differences between sentence structure and linguistic systems 
are another. One other major reason is that there are infinite possible interpretations 
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of a piece of text, based on the family, educational, cultural, religious as well as 
political background of the reader. As a result, it seems not possible to produce an 
equivalent translatum, as the possible meanings of the source text itself is unlimited. 
However, it is noteworthy that the unlimitedness of interpretation is, as suggested in 
Chapter 2, not entirely unlimited, for it is very unlikely for a reader to interpret the 
word “dog” as a kind of cheese or pencil. Meanings are organized by languages and 
constructed by the Symbolic, hence restricted by the Other. Similar to the big Other, 
meanings are not non-existent: they do not exist ontologically, yet exert influence on 
subjects as a kind of unconscious “force”. This “force”, if it ever “exists”, can only 
“exist” psychologically in our mind—it is mutually constructed as an abstract entity, 
and therefore meanings are collective, which is why a “standardized” meaning of a 
certain word would not vary dramatically from one person to another. We must bear 
in mind that although meanings conveyed by texts are much less restrained than what 
we believed in the age of the Author, it does not mean that there is completely no 
restriction or orientation of the meaning of a word. In other words, the afterlife of the 
Text does not develop independently from human readers’ subjectivity.  
 One simple argument which could demonstrate the flaw of unlimited 
interpretations of the Text is that if it were true, equivalent translations would not 
only be possible, but all existing translations would be equivalent to their source 
texts, and all texts would be equivalent to other texts. If a source text may “carry”, or 
more precisely, evoke, unlimited possible meanings, does that not mean that we may 
also have unlimited plausible interpretations of the target text? Therefore, if it is true 
that the Text has an unlimited afterlife which leads to an infinite possibility of 
interpretation, then when we accuse a translatum of not being identical to, i.e. not 
carrying all the possible meanings of, the source text, it was only us as restricted 
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subjects (by the manifestation of the Other which constructs us) who could not read 
other possible meanings of the translatum. If there can be unlimited interpretations of 
the source text and unlimited interpretations of the target text, then certainly the two 
cannot be non-identical? And, if we expand this argument further to an extremely 
radical degree, all words should carry the same meanings since there is an unlimited 
interpretation of a vocabulary. In other words, the meaning of “cat” and “dog”, 
“dead” and “alive”, “comb” and “coffin” and “lecture” and “postcard” would 
nonetheless be the same, or, they should at least share one layer of meanings which 
are the same.  
 But of course, this is not the general case for language uses. The failure of 
this argument, therefore, is already very obvious to us. Our discussion at this point 
has again entered the mystical labyrinth, which is similar to the pure language 
formed by fragments (i.e. human beings as biased and restricted subjects can never 
see the whole picture of the fragments, yet this does not mean that the pure language 
does not exist), and to solve this crux we may want to go back to the previous 
argument, that we should bear in mind that the concept of “unlimited interpretations” 
which bars us from any complete understanding of the text originates from the Text, 
and the authority of this Text is fundamentally based on a self-refuting presumption. 
Nevertheless, let us move back to the creative translation of “end-stop”. 
 Taking “end-stop” as an example, I translated it as 沒端, a new Chinese 
coinage which conveys all three meanings simultaneously without the aid of any 
footnote. 沒端 is a Cantonese homophone of the vocabulary item 末端, which 
means “the extremity” or “the terminal”. The first character 末 is “last” and “final”, 
while the second character 端 means “end”, “extremity” as well as “the tip”. When 
it comes to the meaning of a tip, 端 is not restricted to the concept of a final end as 
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we have vocabulary such as 開端, the start or the beginning, which is literally 
“start/open-tip”. And 末端 is the opposite of 開端, which is literally the “end-tip”.  
 I have replaced the character 末 in 末端 by its Cantonese homophone 沒 
in 沒有, which is “not-having” and “not-being” (which can be followed by both 
concrete and abstract nouns or verbs, i.e. money, happiness or actions such as cry: 
我沒有哭 is I did not cry). 沒 is “without”, not possessing something, or “not”, the 
negation. Borrowing the homophone 沒 to replace the character 末 in 末端, the 
new coinage 沒端 can, as a result, phonologically stand for “the extremity” but can 
simultaneously be interpreted as literally “without-tip” or “no-tip”, hence stands for 
the beginning or continuity.  
 As for my experimental Chinese translation of “end-stop”, the most 
interesting part here is that the new Chinese coinage 沒端, apart from being able to 
convey both the paradoxical meaning of limitation and liberation, the extremity and 
continuity, it can even carry one more extra layer of meaning that the original term 
“end-stop” does not and cannot possess. Besides being self-contradictory, “end-stop” 
is self-limiting in the sense that the existence of a stop is the condition of an “end-
stop”. If we approach the issue from this perspective, the liberation engendered by 
the third meaning of “end-stop” is just a husk; “to end the stop” implies the 
necessary existence of a stop. In the world of an “end-stop”, the stop always exists 
for the basis of all possible liberation and continuity rests on the stop—a stop whose 
existence is to be ended, a stop which can never be ended. The stop is ended. The 
phantom of the stop, never. The residue always haunts.  
 However, in my experimental Chinese translation, my coinage 沒端 carries 
the (excessive) fourth layer of meaning, which is not restricted by the self-limiting 
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feature of “end-stop”. For the English “coinage” “end-stop” has to be inevitably 
bound by the existence of the stop, 沒端 is without any tip, stop or extremity, and 
therefore can be interpreted as the void. 沒 is without, hence non-existence or 
nothingness. 沒端 is, as a result, a realm which has no tip, no corner, no 
delineation, no restriction, a.k.a. a limitless space. It is both limitlessness and 
nothingness, since the void is the only possible existing limitlessness—there is no 
limit because there is no construction in the first place. 
 
 
4.2 Of the universe 
 
 After this brief discussion on the ambiguous coinage “end-stop”, there should 
be no argument that “the end-stop of the universe” can be interpreted as either the 
limitation or the beginning/continuity of the universe (or, of course, both at the same 
time!). However it is very important to ask, what is “the universe” in the first place? 
If we are to check in any English dictionary, a universe is usually referred to as “the 
cosmos”, “the macrocosm”, or even, in some of them, “the totality of known or 
supposed objects and phenomena throughout space”. So, there is no doubt that we 
may understand “the end-stop of the universe” as the end or the death of the cosmos, 
the limitation of the totality of the known—doesn’t this resonate with the nature of 
a(ny) coinage, as we have explained previously, the production of the uncanny, alien 
and bizarre unknown issue from the knowns? If we approach this direction from the 
psychoanalytic perspective, the known would then be the consciousness or 
everything within the Symbolic realm—if “the end-stop of the universe” is the 
limitation of the consciousness, then could it not stand for the hidden side of the 
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coin, i.e. the unconscious? And, if “the end-stop of the universe” is the limitation of 
consciousness or of the Symbolic, could it not be directly related to “in flagrante 
delicto”, as this Latin phrase carries a heavy connotation of adultery, thus sexual 
intercourse, la petite mort and the ephemeral disappearance of the Subject? 
(Moreover, “in flagrante delicto” can also be interpreted as the presence of the big 
Other, as I will show in section 4.3.)  
 As we should remember, “end-stop” can be interpreted as not only a 
limitation but also a beginning/continuity—if we approach the expression “the end-
stop of the universe” from this perspective, it could then stand for the beginning of 
the Subject, as false being, the ego, the consciousness, or of the Symbolic, and hence 
would have a direct relation to the big Other, the formless God whose presence 
penetrates the discovery of the immoral sin, “in flagrante delicto”. Even if we ignore 
the role of the big Other in the discovery, the moment of realization of the illicit 
sexual behaviour per se is probably very similar to the shocking and traumatic 
liberation of the repressed, analogous to the decoding of the unconscious, which can 
be linked to the painful and exciting—it is exciting because it is painful, the surplus 
pleasure achieved from displeasure—rebellion against the consciousness, the 
Symbolic, the masculinity.  
 The word “universe”, apart from the “standardized” meaning of the cosmos, 
can also be interpreted as “uni-verse”, an antonym of “multiverse” which carries the 
connotation of a single dimension, since uni- is a Latin prefix which means “one”. 
To approach the term “uni-verse” from this perspective, it can be related to a “single-
directional thinking”, an insular and dogmatic perception of things, which can be 
further expanded to a totalitarian uni-verse. As a result, “the end-stop of the 
universe” can stand for the limitation of prejudiced totalitarian dichotomy. If we 
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consider this reading of “the end-stop of the universe”, the ending of naive, biased 
binary opposition altogether with “in flagrante delicto”, the latter phrase, about sex 
and hence reproduction, can then link to the possible emergence of new life, new 
belief and new idea. “In flagrante delicto” can, therefore, become the hope. 
 Similar to my translation of the term “end-stop”, I was eager to come up with 
a Chinese translation which would incorporate most of the possible meanings. First, I 
wanted to preserve both the meaning of the cosmos and a simple-headed narrow-
mindedness in the term “universe”. Second, I was hoping to render the target text 
with a richer meaning than the source text (think of the surplus meaning of “the 
void” in “end-stop”), in the sense that the writer’s perception of language and 
naming (or, more precisely, any kind of signification) as limitation. I therefore 
translated “universe” as 語紂 , which is both a Cantonese and a Mandarin 
homophone of the term 宇宙 yǔzhòu, the universe. The first character 語 is 
language and speech, while the second character 紂 is from the name of the most 
notorious king in Chinese history, King Zhou of the Shang Dynasty (商紂), 
historically known for his dishonor and cold-heartedness as the worst (or the best?) 
example of a corrupted king in China. There is an idiom 助紂為虐, literally “to 
assist Zhou to abuse”, which means standing by idly while an (abusive) authority 
treats powerless minorities unfairly. As a result, in Chinese culture, the character 紂 
has a totalitarian, hegemonic and abusive connotation. And, if the term 商紂, Shang 
Zhou, is King Zhou of Shang, then following the same logic, our Chinese coinage 
語紂 can stand for King Zhou of 語, which is of course language. Therefore, the 
homophone 語紂 could mean, firstly, the cosmos, since it is a homophone of 宇宙, 
the universe—the phonetic pronunciations of both terms in both Cantonese and 
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Mandarin are exactly the same. Secondly, 語紂 can be interpreted as the universe of 
language, since 語紂 is a 宇宙 (universe) formed by 語 (language). Last but not 
least, 語紂 can be the King Zhou of language, it can also stand for the (abusive?) 
hegemony of language. But what is “the hegemony of language”? I have considered 
different possibilities from the psychoanalytic perspective and have come up with a 
few plausible interpretations of this expression: 
 To start with, it could mean the big Other who controls and speaks through 
the barred Subject. Let us look at the Lacanian Schema L (Figure 1) for a more 
careful illustration of the Other (and its relation to the Lacanian Subject). This graph 
is presented in an article in Lacan’s collection Ecrits (2006), “Seminar on ‘The 
Purloined Letter’”, which is designed to elucidate the intersubjective dialectic of the 
Subject, through the demonstration of the relations between the Subject S, the small 
other a’, the ego and the big Other A. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schema L 
Source: Lacan, Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”, Ecrits, p.40. 
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 The top left hand corner, S, is the stupid unknowing subject. Subverting the 
traditional view of a “subject”, Lacan theorizes it as someone who does not know 
rather than someone who knows.  As Lacan says in Seminar XX, “there’s no such 
thing as a knowing subject (il n’y a pas de sujet connaissant)”. (126/114) The 
unknowing Subject, like Oedipus, acts without knowing in the conscious sense why 
(he murders his father and sleeps with his mother). If we are to trace it back to 
Schema L, the Subject is constructed and controlled by various self-perceived others 
whose influence is demonstrated with strings in the z-shape as illustrated in the 
figure. The party who exerts direct influence on the subject S is a’, the small other, 
which is usually embodied by human beings in real lives, such as the subject’s 
parents, teachers and friends, or even important men whom the subject has never met 
in daily life but is significantly influenced by, especially ideologically, such as 
political giants or influential philosophers (e.g. Karl Marx or Slavoj Žižek). 
However, this specular small other, embodied as the important or inspirational 
people of the subject, is not literally the “other” since the subject can never really 
understand anyone besides himself (this self as the ego, the false being), as our 
perception forbids us to penetrate other people’s minds. In other words, this small 
other is merely the subject’s perception of the other, i.e. how I think my parents or 
teachers think of me, and hence is precisely speaking the subject’s subjective 
psychological (hence fictional) construct. This fictional construct is, however, strong 
enough to superimpose on the subject, which affects both the subject’s self-
perception (the ego) and the subject’s perception of the perfect self (the ideal-ego), 
which therefore has an absolutely un-neglectable power which can regulate and 
restrain the subject’s behaviors and, most significantly, thoughts. The small other a’ 
controls the subject through the imaginary relation which imposes an illusionary 
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effect on the ego, a, which is located at the lower left hand corner of the schema. We, 
as subjects, see ourselves occupying the position of the ego (instead of the hopeless, 
idiotic Subject who knows nothing but is spoken through) and this is what Lacan 
terms as “a structural anamorphosis of human’s psychology”. Lacan has once put it 
in a tactful and ironic tone that “[the subject] may believe the ego is him”, which is 
utterly a structural misrecognition (méconnaissance) in the human’s psyche. Since 
the formation of the ego is based on the reflective image of the other, Lacan indicates 
the nature of identification, in Seminar I (1953-54), as misrecognition: “Although 
based on the recognition of the specular image, the ego can be conceived as ‘a 
capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)’” (153).  
 The lower right hand corner of Schema L is occupied by the big Other A, 
which is an ontologically absent but phenomenologically present, impersonal 
projection of the small other a’. It can be reasonably interpreted as cultural norms, 
beliefs, ideologies or the mysterious voice which speaks us; the big Other is 
structurally similar to the small other in the sense that they can both be the subject’s 
psychological (i.e. fictional) constructs. Both the small other and the big Other are 
the introjected otherness or outsider who plays an influential role in the subject’s 
self-perception. In other words, Lacan has theorized human subjectivity as an 
imaginary construction which relies on the introjected specular other. The subject is, 
dramatically contrary to how we normally think of it, nothing but a stupid puppet 
who knows nothing, who has its strings in the hands of the massive, unseen big 
Other which is like “a formless god […who...] has a body and does not exist” 
(Seminar XVII, p.66). This Other is directly related to language as, for Lacan, the 
unconscious is “the discourse of the Other” and is “being structured like a language” 
(67). Language is, in Lacan’s exact words, “the condition of the unconscious”. What 
 71 
does this imply? The significance of the Other originating from language lies in the 
fact that the Symbolic order is a human construction in the first place, hence 
inconsistent. This explains why Lacan has theorized the big Other the “dead” dummy 
in contract bridge, la mort. This Other seems to be an all-knowing, all-powerful 
Other but is actually incomplete, inconsistent and impotent—and this is how Lacan 
interprets obsession. Rejecting the common perception that sacrifice relies on the 
notion of exchange, Lacanian psychoanalysis explains sacrifice as “a gesture that 
enacts the disavowal of the impotence of the big Other”. In On Belief, Žižek has 
followed the teaching of Lacan in order to explain why the compulsion to sacrifice is 
both superfluous and fake: “at its most elementary, the subject does not offer his 
sacrifice to profit from himself, but to fill in the lack in the Other, to sustain the 
appearance of the Other’s omnipotence or, at least, consistency” (70). 
 As a result, the big Other is the (impotent) abusive figure which controls and 
speaks through the stupid subject and therefore can be implied by “the hegemony of 
language”, i.e. 語紂. 
 The second possible link to the hegemonic power of language is the lethal 
factor in the formation of the Lacanian subject. The process of alienation during 
subject-formation involves a vel, the Latin way to put down either/or. In Seminar XI, 
Lacan provides a classic example of his vel of alienation, which is the mugger’s 
threat: “Your money or your life!” (212). Obviously, one’s freedom of choice is 
restricted here because the only freedom one may achieve is to choose death. If a 
person chooses to keep hold of his money, his life will be taken from him, then his 
money. In other words, by choosing life and letting go of the money he will still be 
alive, but if he chooses money then he will lose both (not just one or the other). This 
is similar to the struggle between the subject and the Other. In the Lacanian vel of 
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alienation, the subject is the money which “immediately drops out of the picture […] 
in his or her confrontation with the Other,” which is symbolized by life in the 
mugger’s example (Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 51). For a subject to exist insofar as 
it can be spoken of and spoken for (though never completely), it must be beingless, 
since to incorporate into the Symbolic, the subject must have given up being for 
meaning/thinking. “While alienation is the necessary ‘first step’ in acceding to 
subjectivity, this step involves choosing ‘one’s own’ disappearance” (Lacanian 51). 
In other words, the disappearance of being for meaning is an inevitable consequence 
of the intrusion of language. This is Lacan’s definition of his subject: “either I am not 
thinking or I am not” (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, Seminar XI 
 
 As this choice between being and meaning is, after all, a choice made when 
one is deprived of the freedom of choice, Lacan’s vel of alienation and its lethal 
factor can also be understood as “the hegemony of language”. 
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 The third possible implication of “the hegemony of language” is the power of 
disavowal that languages grant to humans. As we do not have enough space in this 
paper to go through this topic in depth, I will just mention it very briefly here. 
Language is full of traumatic inconsistency since the relation between the signifiers 
and the signified is arbitrary, in other words, the real may intrude in the superficially 
stabilized reality through the inconsistency—what you claim is A can actually be B. 
The emergence of language creates the possibility of lying, and therefore the 
suspension of belief. Moreover, language creates the power of negativity, since there 
is no negativity when there is no symbolization. Both of these can be linked to 
anxiety and (the core of) trauma for human beings. 
 
 As a result, I have translated the phrase “the end-stop of the universe” into the 
pun of 宇宙的末端 (the extremity of the universe). The original “end-stop of the 
universe” could mean the limitation of the universe, the continuity of the universe as 
well as the limitation or/and continuity of a flat-toned world(view). However, with 
my new coinages we have formed the pun 語紂的沒端 (the no-tip of the king Zhou 
of language), which carries at least four additional meanings: the first one is the void, 
or the endlessness, of the universe, since 沒端 is without-tip. The second meaning 
is the void of the Symbolic as 語紂 can be understood as “the universe of 
language”; the void of the Symbolic is known as objet a, the cause of desire, the 
surplus as well as a lack which rests on or is manifested as different objects of desire 
but is never possibly grasped. (It is important to bear in mind that the translation of 
“the end-stop of the universe” could stand for objet a, as this interpretation of the 
phrase can be linked directly to the translation of the expression “in flagrante 
delicto”, as I will explain in section 3.3). The third possible interpretation of 語紂的
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沒端 is the limitation of the Symbolic realm, which hence is a reference to the Real. 
Last but not least, our polysemous Chinese translation of “the end-stop of the 
universe” can also stand for the continuity of the hegemonic abuse of language; and 
as for the hegemony of language, we may refer to the big Other, the lethal factor in 
the Lacan’s vel of alienation and the power of disavowal and the suspension of belief 
granted by languages, all of which I have clearly explained in the previous 
paragraphs. And, from this perspective, if we focus on the last interoperation, the pun 
語紂的沒端 can therefore mean the excess (e.g. the power of disavowal) originates 
with the emergence of languages. 
 Combining the Chinese translation of the “end-stop” and “uni-verse” 
together, we generate the phrase 語紂的沒端. Because of a—if you will allow me to 
use this word—clever utilization of homophones, a discrepancy between the inured 
“inherent” meanings of the terms (originating from the phonetic pronunciation) and 
the literal meanings that the written characters stand for is created. This tricky tactic 
of using homophones and puns has translated the ambivalent and paradoxical nature 
of the phrase from the source text to the target text. My Chinese translation of “the 
end-stop of the universe” can not only preserve the multiplicity of the source text to 
an extremely high degree, but also generate new, additional (excess!) meanings for 
the reading of the target text.  
 
 
4.3 In flagrante delicto 
 
 “In flagrante delicto” is a (medieval) Latin phrase. First recorded in 1772, 
this phrase has gradually been incorporated into the English language and is now 
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well-known by all educated speakers of English. As an ablative case which is formed 
by the adjective flagrans (flaming/blazing) and the noun delictum (offense/crime), 
this expression cannot be translated into any simple English equivalence, as the verb 
is missing. However, to achieve the closest translation, the phrase “in flagrante 
delicto” could be rendered in English as “in blazing offense”, which means being 
caught red-handed in the very act of committing an offense or a crime. Not restricted 
to sexual transgression but often associated with adultery, this Latin phrase indicates 
the discovery of an illicit behavior, usually in the midst of sexual activities. In other 
words, this expression is about a discovery, which has a sexual connotation in its 
ideological baggage. 
 Since “in flagrante delicto” is not English, I don’t consider it problematic to 
translate this expression into a language besides written standard Chinese, as this 
phrase itself is already “standing alone” in the source text. To preserve the feeling of 
uniqueness and the impact of emphasis, we may consider keeping this phrase in 
Medieval Latin rather than rendering it into standard written Chinese. However, the 
difficulty in preserving the exact same phrase in target texts is that most common 
Chinese readers do not know Latin, not even those who have attended tertiary 
education: in both Hong Kong and mainland China, business and science majors 
have almost no reason, nor chance, to learn a dead language, and as for arts majors 
who are supposed to be interested in languages, English, French, Spanish, Japanese 
and Korean are nonetheless more popular choices among students. Although “in 
flagrante delicto” has entered the English corpus, non-native speakers over here 
usually learn English as a second language for academic, business or communication 
purpose, and therefore our syllabus for general English education tends to focus on 
pragmatic and “useful” knowledge (e.g. English grammar, writing formal business 
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letters or proposals etc.). For arts majors, I suspect that only part of the literature 
students would know the expression “in flagrante delicto”, and I would not have 
expected linguistics or cultural studies students to have heard of this phrase. As a 
result, only an extremely small number of Chinese scholars would understand Latin, 
and nevertheless the cultural force of the phrase would definitely be very different 
for them than for their counterparts among source readers. Therefore, I believe that 
in order to adapt the text for the target reader, we should translate the expression into 
a language which is easier for general Chinese readers to understand.  
 Finally, I have decided to translate the expression “in flagrante delicto” into 
Cantonese, under the thought that it may collide with my previous Cantonese 
homophones in “end-stop” and therefore gives an integral feeling to the entire piece 
of writing.  
 The Cantonese translation of “in flagrante delicto” is 偷食果時俾人捉到. 
果 gwo2 (fruit), is phonetically similar to the character 嗰 go2 and is often 
borrowed in (informal) written Cantonese texts, since 果 is an officially accepted 
Chinese character but 嗰 is merely adopted in Cantonese to imply “that”, which is 
rarely included in the corpus of Chinese input programs.  
 嗰 時  together as a vocabulary item in Cantonese means “at that 
time/moment”. 偷食 is to eat something (usually food) forbidden secretly, which is 
a Chinese euphemism for having illicit sexual behavior. 偷食 is, therefore, highly 
related to transgression and sin. 人 is human, but is considered a general 3rd-person 
pronoun in this example, which means others, other people. 俾人捉到 is a passive 
form of 捉 (catch), literally “being caught by others”. As a result, the expression 偷
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食嗰時俾人捉到 means being caught by others while eating (something forbidden) 
secretly, i.e. being caught in the midst of illicit sexual behavior.  
 To eat something forbidden is to engulf extra food. In most cases, this extra is 
a twin brother of a lack, like two sides of the same coin, as, if there is not a lack in 
the first place, the person does not have to eat something that s/he is not supposed to 
eat. This action of having extra food is very likely to be linked to repetition and the 
oral drive, which is externalized when the gap between the goal of eliminating 
hunger and the aim of satisfaction becomes obvious. This oral drive is, in a certain 
sense, similar to the sex drive, and in this case there is an apparent similarity between 
excess food and excess sex, excess jouissance. This relation between eating and 
having sex, which are both considered biological needs (for sexually reproductive 
animals) driven by basic instincts, is noticed not only by our Chinese ancestors (e.g. 
Confucius said, 食色性也, both appetite and desire are nature) and in our culture 
(e.g. 偷食) but also in the Western culture, as implied by the use of languages—for 
example, metaphors of food for other humans, especially women, seems to be a 
prevalent  phenomenon in both Chinese and English language speaking countries. 
In Cantonese, for instance, a pork chop (豬扒) is an ugly woman, a vegetable (菜) is 
a girlfriend while a king crab (in Cantonese, “long leg crab”, 長腳蟹) is a woman 
with a pair of long legs; in English, a lollipop is an attractive young girl, a 
cheesecake is a half-naked female photographic model and a tart is a sexually 
immoral or attractive woman. From the above examples, I suspect that the noticing 
of similarities between appetite and sexual desire is universal. 
 One interesting common feature shared by the appetites for food and sexual 
desire is that, as suggested in the previous paragraph, the gap between the goal and 
the aim would externalize drive, and therefore lead to repetition. The drive here is, as 
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theorized by Lacan, partial and lethal since it is structured around (and originated 
from) objet a, the lack in the Symbolic network which both triggers and disrupts the 
circuit (which leads to repetition). And here, objet a, as the core of repetition and as 
the void (which is the essence here because a lack or a loss is the condition of desire 
and drive), actually refers back to our Chinese translation of “end-stop of the 
universe”, which could mean objet a, referencing to the Real and the void as 
explained in the previous section.  
 Another interesting little point that I am eager to draw your attention to 
concerns the two preconditions of the desire. Two factors must exist for desire to 
present: one is the lack, and the other one is the prohibition. Let us first look at the 
significance of a lack. Since a lack or loss is the required presumption for the 
existence of desire or drive, the Subject actually wants the lack to be there so that 
s/he can continue to desire. As in Žižek’s interpretation of Freud’s fort-da game, it is 
the presence rather than the absence of the mother which creates anxiety: “it is not 
that, anxious about losing my mother, I try to master her departure/arrival; it is that, 
anxious about her overwhelming presence, I try desperately to carve out a space 
where I can gain a distance toward her” (59-60). The Subject desires the lack 
because without the absence there can be no desire or expectation of the mother’s 
returning. In other words, the satisfaction is denied (temporarily postponed, as the 
Subject believes) but desire is sustained. Instead of the usual idea of loss creating 
anxiety, it is that anxiety occurs when the place of loss is taken, i.e. when the loss is 
not there. Žižek applies this idea to emigration, arguing that those who are leaving 
their countries feel upset not because people and memories from their hometowns are 
irreplaceable and they miss them, but because they understand deep in their hearts 
that their home countries will be replaced by a new foreign town very soon and they 
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will not miss their own country anymore—the once familiar place will turn foreign 
and the feeling of the loss (of the “root”) will disappear very soon. In Žižek’s 
theories, this is what truly evokes anxiety. In other words, it is the presence rather 
than absence which brings distress. 
 Also, desire arises because of the presence of the Law (which functions as 
prohibition), the nom du père (name of the father), which sounds very much like the 
non du père (no of the father). Desire is aroused through the acceptance of the 
Phallus, the Law based on the power of the Phallus, the Name of the Father which 
can be linked very easily to the No of the Father, the prohibition. For Lacan has 
theorized the Phallus as an empty signifier, so that desire arises from the acceptance 
of an empty signifier which stands for a lack. Again, we can refer this back to the 
emptiness or the void of the Symbolic universe, i.e. 語紂的沒端. 
  Based on the argument above that, first, it is the presence which evokes 
anxiety and, second, prohibition is the condition of desire, I suggest that in the 
imaginary situation of (the discovery of) adultery—the meaning of in flagrante 
delicto—is not restricted to sexual transgression, hence definitely not restricted to 
adultery, in which two parties are willingly involved in the sexual intercourse, which 
is why rape would also be considered in the later part of this discussion (pp. 83-4). 
However, adultery is certainly included and referred to by this Latin phrase; 
therefore, the argument that I am raising now is not unrelated to our discussion of the 
text as well as the translatum. Adultery is not the only one but definitely one of the 
possible interpretations of the phrase. As one of the layers of meanings, it is still 
worth our attention to investigate how far this argument can go—the idea that couple 
involved actually pervertedly wanted to 俾人捉到, be caught by the third party 
(general). They were secretly eager to be caught by the other and, I argue, the Other. 
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It is normal for us to question immediately who would want to be caught in flagrante 
delicto when their reputation, career, marriage or family may be destroyed, but this is 
exactly how the unconscious works, it always functions in an absurd, “abnormal” 
and “perverted” way—which is why those streams of thoughts are repressed by our 
consciousness. The “sinners”, in adultery, desire to be witnessed and caught by the 
Other when they 偷食 since the discovery of the transgression gives the ultimate 
significance, the ultimate meaning, to the action of 偷食—this is a specific scenario 
set up for the big Other. If I do not possess any lack, why would I have to take the 
risk to 偷食? This is a delicate performance to show the audience, the Other (in the 
physical manifestation of the others) that “I do not have the agalma”,6 i.e. there is a 
lack in me, so that I can continue to desire. 
 In the above discussion, the phrase 偷食果時俾人捉到 was analyzed as 偷
食/果時/俾人/捉到, in which 果時 is considered as one term, a homophone of 嗰時
, “at that moment”. However, this Cantonese expression can be interpreted by a 
diverse sentence structure, as thus: 
 偷食 (v.) /果 (n.) /時/俾人/捉到 
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, 果 refers to “fruit” in standard written 
Chinese. If we interpret the sentence from this structure, then 果, the fruit, would 
become the object of the verb (偷)食. The phrase would then become: at the moment 
                                                 
6
 In the early stage of Lacanian teaching, the term “agalma”, meaning an ornament, a glory or an 
offering to the gods in Greek, is adopted as almost an synonym of the Lacanian objet petit a when 
objet a was considered an imaginary part-object but not yet theorized as the leftover, the void. In 
Seminar VIII Le transfert (1960-61), Lacan used the term agalma altogether with objet a, for the fact 
that they are extremely similar in nature: the agalma is, according to Plato’s Symposium, a precious 
object hidden inside a worthless box, analogous to the objet petit a as the valuable object-cause of 
desire which we seek in the big Other. The agalma is the objet of desire which props up the fantasy 
that desire is fulfillable; in other words, it proprs up reality and the (superficial) consistency of the 
Other.  
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that (someone) 偷食 the fruit, s/he is caught by others. Since 偷食 is to eat 
something forbidden in a secret manner, the fruit that one 偷食 is a forbidden fruit, 
the forbidden fruit, which carries the biblical connotation of both knowledge and sex. 
Here, the sexual connotation resonates with the euphemism 偷食, which reinforces 
the sexual implication of in flagrante delicto. Knowledge, as Lacan elaborated in 
Seminar XVII, is a means of jouissance. When knowledge is at work it produces 
entropy, a loss—this entropy comes from the use of signifiers to achieve jouissance, 
therefore if the signifier (the phallus) is the stopgap to loss but the person pursues 
objet a, i.e. loss, through it, then that act destabilizes the system of knowledge. In 
plain English, most people use knowledge to answer questions and fill in gaps of the 
reality so that they have a stable understanding of the world; however, for academics, 
knowledge is not a stopping point but a tool which leads us to more questions. In this 
sense, knowledge is entropic to a stable belief system. So, knowledge can remind us 
of loss, which can therefore refer back to the term “末端” in the third sentence. 
Moreover, it is the love of truth which is embodied in knowledge, while the love of 
truth is the love of what truth hides, i.e. the love of castration. And, as for sex, Lacan 
has put it in Seminar XX again and again (which later on becomes one of his mottos) 
that there is no sexual relation. The impossibility of sexual relationship refers to the 
idea that the big Other is the 3rd party which always has to situate between the two 
people—and doesn’t it explain for itself why 偷食果時 the person actually wants 
to, or even have to, 俾人 (3rd party general, i.e. others) 捉到? 
 The other part that I would like to devote time to discuss regarding the phrase 
“in flagrante delicto” is the nature of forbidden sex. Putting this phrase in 
consideration with the next one, what conclusions can we draw? What is the end-stop 
of the universe? Is the forbidden sex a limitation (the forbiddance implies limits and 
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boundaries in nature), a liberation (transgression as a liberation from the limitation), 
or both? When it comes to adultery, we could approach it from three dimensions: its 
nature, its product and its by-product. 
 There is no doubt that the nature of forbidden sexual behavior is 
transgression. Adultery, or any other means of sexual “crime” such as incest or rape, 
is a transgression of social norms, morality, authority, the Law and, last but not least, 
the Symbolic order. All the limitations here have something to do with patriarchy 
and masculinity. Adultery, when it is consensual, is an assault on hierarchical and 
patriarchal beliefs not only because it functions as a sign of celebration or an illicit 
achievement of women’s sexual freedom against the patriarchal authority and laws; 
and when it is nonconsensual, in other words, rape, it is still a severe assault on 
patriarchal values and beliefs because from a patriarchal point of view the woman 
who is raped is stolen or corrupted (violated) by the rapist, as a thief, from the father 
or the husband—in other words, the father or the husband is illicitly deprived of his 
property by men who are not situated in the hierarchy of the family, hence is not 
only an assault on the victim but also her male family members. This explains why in 
an extremely patriarchal society, people tend to assault women as a kind of revenge 
on their male family members.  For example, acid attacks on women are relatively 
more popular in the Middle East, where people believe that disfiguring a woman’s 
face brings not only shame on the entire family but also a huge financial burden to 
the father, if the woman is not yet married (for it is unlikely for her to wed in the 
future).  
 Therefore, although rape is the entire opposite of women’s sexual freedom, 
the act of rape is nonetheless an attack on the established patriarchal law, morality 
and norms simultaneously, since if women are property, rape is theft. Rape is, 
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therefore, an extremely patriarchal protest against not only women but also the 
“powerful” men (who “own” the women as daughters or wives), hence, against the 
established, “normal”, “well-accepted” patriarchal law. Therefore, no matter whether 
it occurs in the form of adultery or rape, illicit sexual behavior is an assault on the 
established patriarchy, not only because it usually celebrates women’s sexual 
freedom but also due to the inextricable fact that it transgresses established norms 
(hence the masculine way of positing, labeling, defining and organizing things, 
including the masculine Symbolic).  
 As a result, illicit sexual behavior implies the transgression of masculine 
boundaries in the sense of the patriarchal marriage system, in both adultery and rape. 
Some patriarchal societies try to make up for the “flaw” in the system by marrying 
the rape victim to the rapist, yet this is to justify the means by the end; there is no 
doubt that both the victim and the woman’s family is violated in the action of rape 
(e.g. the father may have planned to marry the daughter to another family with a 
better financial situation, and the rape would determine the plan and force not only 
the victim but also the family to “choose” the “only” way), and this again makes the 
action of rape transgressive and rebellious. 
 If we are to understand why forbidden sex is a transgression of the Symbolic, 
we have to consider the second question: what is the product of illicit sexual 
behavior? The very direct product of sexual intercourse is sexual orgasm—la petite 
mort. Instigated by the shameful, forbidden desire, two people share each other’s 
body (through the Other’s presence, as Lacan insists in Seminar XX, there is no such 
thing as sexual relationship because “sexual difference is a function of one’s position 
with respect to the Other”—which is why the general pronoun of the third party 
(plural), must exist in my translation) and passion, the mixture of sweat and fluid 
 84 
(which leads to the possible emergence of an excess new life—I will come to this 
when we discuss the third question, the by-product of sexual intercourse). A 
disgraceful sin, a sinful disgrace, destined to end with the production of jouissance. 
Isn’t the yielding to jouissance a process of the Lacanian Subject’s disappearance 
(from the Symbolic order), switching from the mode of having to the mode of being? 
From desire to drive, from the masculine Symbolic to the feminine, fathomless Real, 
isn’t this an (ephemeral) attempt of Symbolic suicide? The extinguishment of the 
Subject occurs simultaneously when sexual orgasm starts in that split single 
moment… 
 Sex, reproduction, leads to the (possibility of the) emergence of new lives. 
But for most illicit sexual behaviors, pleasure (or in the more specific term, 
jouissance) rather than reproduction should be the main reason for people to commit 
the act. In most cases, getting pregnant from adultery is, if not horrifying, at least 
worrying and distressing news, since this brings dishonor to both the woman and the 
(future) kid. So, one possible by-product of forbidden sex is a child whose paternity 
is unknown. Without the acknowledgement of the father, the child cannot inherit the 
surname and property of the father (as we see the relation between the words 
“property” and “proper”: only “proper” individuals can inherit the paternal property). 
The existence of this child is an excess in a patriarchal society; repeating to haunt the 
impotence of the Father, the child would remain a surplus. This embryo, a metaphor 
of the bud of new ideas and new directions, poses a threat to the Law. Remember 
(the Lacanian interpretation of) the Oedipal complex: the child desires to be the 
object of the mOther’s desire and hence competes with his father, and gradually 
realizes that instead of becoming the object of desire it is better to possess it, and as a 
result the child identifies with the Father (who the Subject believes is the target of 
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the mOther’s desire), in order to determine what the Father has that makes the 
mOther desire him. After entering the Symbolic order through this transference 
(identification with the Father), the child Oedipally murders the actual father’s 
embodiment of the role of the second Other (the Name of the Father, whose gaze 
witnesses the Subject’s entry and interaction within the social Symbolic system of 
normative behavior, as well as his barring from the non-Symbolic self) in order to 
encounter the Other in anyone or anything, and thence enter a highly complex and 
ever-changing social network. In other words, a child, especially an excess child, 
functions as new, alternative ideologies, imposes a threat on the Father, the 
masculine way of positing, depicting and constructing things. A child whose 
patricidal impulse can never be tamed. 
 If we return to the idea of the new life as new ideas, doesn’t it sound more 
persuasive for it to fight against the long-established authority, morality, the Law—
the uni-verse? And if we are to return to the metaphor of the embryo with mysterious 
paternity as a by-product, doesn’t translation occupy the same position as well, in 
that both are a surplus? Translation is an excess in the sense that it is something extra 
(additional to the source text), something generated by the after-life of a text—and, if 
we are to understand “In flagrante delicto. The end-stop of the universe” with the 
notion of translation: doesn’t it mean that translation, the surplus of the source texts, 
can function as both a limitation of the universe (of knowledge and belief) as well as 
a liberation from the totalitarian single-mind-thinking, all depending on the role of 
the translator? If we are to combine the reading (or translation) of the two phrases 
“[i]n flagrante delicto” and “[t]he end-stop of the universe” together, we could have 
achieved something more than all the possibilities that I have raised in the above 
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paragraphs—for example, we may incorporate “the end-stop of the universe” into “in 
flagrante delicto” by rendering them as 偷食語紂的末端果時俾人捉到.  
 In this (re-)presentation, the object of eat becomes 語紂的末端, which is the 
void, objet a, the excess—and therefore can’t we understand this sentence as “eating 
the forbidden void secretly and being discovered by others”? The idea of eating the 
void immediately reminds me of Kafka’s short story “A Hunger Artist”—isn’t the 
hunger artist in the story eating the Nothing, and isn’t this the manifestation of a pure 
drive, partial and lethal? And isn’t it how it is linked to objet a and repetition?  
Kafka’s work is known for the reference to the concept of the abject, while the 
relation between the abject, the uncanny and the Real is quite obvious. All these 
three concepts are about something beyond the Symbolic order, the traumatic core of 
the uncertainity, which would therefore initiate repulsion and fear. Coming across 
with the abject, the uncanny and the Real would have a traumatic effect on the 
Subject, and therefore evoke jouissance. It is crucial to remember that rather than just 
an extreme pleasure, jouissance is a deadly (dis)pleasure, which pervertedly leads to 
an illicit pleasure. In other words, the idea of jouissance includes both attraction and 
repulsion, both exist but which one is stronger would depend on the situation and on 
the Subject. Some people would find sexual orgasm enticing, some may find it 
horrifying, while still others would find both. 
 If we approach the Chinese translation of “in flagrante delicto” and “the end-
stop of the universe” in this way, doesn’t it mean a secret desire (forbidden yearning 
for a pure drive) to be discovered by the big Other? And since drive correlates to the 
Real of the Mother rather than the Symbolic of the Father, can we possibly see it as 
the positing, defining, symbolizing and hence limiting Symbolic’s discovery of the 
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disruption of the deconstructing Real? A transgression which yields jouissance, 
which refers directly to our other example of interesting Chinese translation, 性明. 
 
 
4.4 I am a sexualist 
 
 Sexualist in Chinese is 性論者, literally a sex-theory-person (a person who 
believes in sexual theory), or 性主義者 (a person who supports sexualism). Apart 
from the foreignness this construction carries (for the pattern of X-theory-person is a 
direct translation of X-ist from English, i.e. X-ism person—a person who supports 
X-ism), the term 性論者 is not very special. But, one interesting point here is that 
the character 性 (sex), in Cantonese, shares the exact same pronunciation with the 
character 聖, sing3, which means holy, sacred or saint. Although they are not 
homophones in Mandarin, Cantonese is phonetically more similar to the older 
language that ancient Chinese used when compared with Mandarin. (This has 
explained why many poems written in the Tang dynasty only rhyme in Cantonese 
but not Mandarin.) The homophones here imply an exquisite relation between sex 
and holiness, which is against many stereotypes of the “traditional” Chinese as 
conservatives who see sex as a crime or sin. In other words, 性論者, a sexualist, is a 
聖論者, a person who believes in the theory of God or someone who worships the 
sacred holiness. Didn’t some tribes from ancient cultures regard reproductive organs 
such as the phallus and the vagina as symbols of mystic sacred power so that they 
carved them into statues so that they could worship them? When it comes to the 
discourse of religion and holiness, sex is linked to both the origin of power and the 
 88 
concept of contrition and repentance. As for the origin of power, it is proved not only 
by the archeological evidence of giant statues or rock cravings—we may also tell this 
from the use of language. In Chinese, the character 性 sex also stands for natural 
property and deposition, while in ancient Chinese, 性 was seldom used as sex but 
more often adopted as “nature”, which is very similar to physis in Greek. From the 
constitution of the character 性, it is not difficult to see its relation to the notion of 
(the power of) birth and growth since the right component of this character is 生, 
which is life or birth. And of course, the other meaning of the character 性, sex, has 
an extremely intimate relation with birth and growth through sexual reproduction. 
 When we talk about repentance, the moment of the discovery of a sin, in 
flagrante delicto, is simultaneously the moment of condoning a sin. The conscience 
is at work: the guilt that persists in the process of adultery is (and can only be) 
alleviated when one is caught red-handed, “in blazing offense”. The nightmare about 
the crime could only stop recurring after the sin is revealed and condoned. So, the 
main point is about discovery. Why is the act of discovery so special? “To avoid 
discovery I stay on the run. To discover things for myself I stay on the run” 
(Powerbook 3). For Jeanette Winterson, discovery is something that we both long 
and are afraid to achieve. It is about consciousness and the unconscious, the hidden 
truth and the Other’s desire; it is a struggle between the inclination to achieve 
pleasure and the innate death-drive. When we have nightmares which reveal the real 
and let the reality drop, we always wake up immediately before the painted veil is 
left so that we can continue to dream. This is what Lacan describes as the fantasy 
propping up the reality. We awake in order to continue to dream, which is, in Žižek’s 
explanation, to escape the real (the “psychic reality”) of our desire. To avoid 
discovering what does not collide with our fantasy, we stay on the run. But at the 
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same time our consciousness tells us that we want to discover so we stay on the run. 
Both wanting and not wanting to discover, we stay on the run.  
 And now, I want to talk about my choice of the first character 私 in my 
experimental Chinese translation of “I am a sexualist”, 私是性論者. As mentioned 
in section 4.3, the 私 here is the Japanese Kanji for “I”, pronounced as わたし 
(watashi). This is a gender-neutral first-person pronoun used in formal or polite 
contexts, though in informal or causal contexts it is usually perceived as a feminine 
pronoun. One reason for me to choose to adopt a Japanese Kanji instead of a Chinese 
character for the pronoun “I” that I want to bring emphasis to this word, “I”, the 
starting word in the first Sappho chapter in Art & Lies, for it is arguably one of the 
most transgressive words in the Symbolic, similar to proper names. 
 What does the shifter “I” stand for when I articulate the word “I”? 
 “I” in the sentence “I am a sexualist” is an enunciating subject, the one “who 
may take pleasure in speaking or find it painful to speak, or who may make a slip 
while speaking. The enunciating subject is the one who may let slip something that is 
revealing as to his or her feelings, desires, or pleasures.” (Fink Reading 24) If you 
still remember the Schema L that we investigated in section 4.2 (Figure 1), the 
enunciating subject “I” is the ego situated at the lower left hand corner. The ego 
arises as “a crystallization or sedimentation of ideal images, tantamount to a fixed, 
reified object with which a child learns to identify, which a child learns to identify 
with him or herself” (Fink Lacanian 36). What is interesting about the notion of “I” 
is that when a person speaks, s/he thinks that s/he is situated at the place of the ego in 
Schema L. The enunciating subject always believes that s/he knows what s/he 
speaks, it is him or her who has chosen which certain vocabulary to use in a sentence 
so as to convey what s/he thinks—but of course this is an illusion. All 
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psychoanalysts believe that apart from the ego talk (which is conscious, intentional 
and alienated by the nature of language), speech is also controlled and shaped by the 
Other’s discourse—any slip of the tongue or jokes reveal the unconscious, or in 
Freud’s words, “the truth has spoken”. In other words, the enunciating subject thinks 
that s/he is the ego, but the place that s/he actually occupies is the top left hand 
corner, S, for the stupid, unknowing Subject. This is how my word play in 私 
comes into the picture.  
 The kanji 私, わたし for “I” in Japanese, is also a standard written Chinese 
character. In the Chinese language, the character 私 is “illicit”, “private” or 
“secret”. For example, 私事 is personal/private matters, 私自 is to do something 
secretly without the approval of authority, while 私吞 is to illicitly engulf benefits 
or money (in corruption) while 走私, “run-secret”, is to smuggle. Interestingly 
enough, the character 私 simultaneously carries a sexual connotation: for instance, 
the word 私處, literally “private/secret part”, refers to the sexual reproductive 
organs for both male and female. 私病, “private illness”, is sexually transmitted 
disease. So the intimate relation between the ego, the character 私 and the context is 
getting very clear—for 私 is a secret, the secret which has to be kept away from the 
ego for eternity is that s/he is the Subject. Here I am not saying that we may never 
understand the psychoanalytic concept of the Subject, for many scholars in this field 
have written so much about a “subject”, or in the English speaking countries a 
“patient”, an “individual” or a “client” (in some schools of psychology), as a noun 
referencing the analysand. The “subject” in such contexts is, of course, le malade 
(the patient, i.e. the sick person) who says “Doctor, I have a problem” or, if we are to 
think deeper in this matter, it can be not only the face of the patient but also the 
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whole defensive persona developed by the analysand to block access to the big 
Other. However, this is not the Lacanian subject for it is, in Fink’s words, “neither 
the individual nor what we might call the conscious subject (or the consciously 
thinking subject), in other words, the subject referred to by most of analytic 
philosophy” (Lacanian 36). 
 If we are to think of the subject from this perspective, we can never truly 
experience the Lacanian subject by ourselves, i.e. to experience myself as the 
subject, for whenever we think, we think as the ego. The notion of our experience as 
Lacanian subjects can therefore only be an abstract, imaginary psychological 
perception—I have to be able to think (consciously) before I know that I am and this 
being in “I am” can, as a result, only be the false being, the ego. I can only think 
(consciously) of the notion of (myself as) a Subject after I can think (consciously as 
the ego). More precisely, it, the big Other, has to think me before the establishment 
of the ego (hence the sense of self) because the Other is the origin of the language in 
which the subject exists. This is why Lacan has implied the impossibility of 
demonstrating the existence of the Lacanian subject in Seminar XXIII, “the subject is 
never more than supposed”. In other words, ourselves as the subjects can only be our 
assumption, i.e. our psychological construction raised from the conscious thinking, 
the ego. Therefore, the idea of the Lacanian subject to us can be a very tricky one—
we can articulate it in English, in Chinese, in Japanese, or any other languages that 
we like and we may “explain” it by seeking refuge from the deferring of the 
signifying chain, but after all we cannot really know or realize, or in a more suitable 
term, experience, what the subject means or what it is—it is not that the Lacanian 
subject does not exist (nonexistent), but its nature is, I argue, analytically 
unthinkable. This is why I label it as a secret: the notion of the Lacanian subject can 
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only remain a secret to us, and this is the secret of the ego that s/he does not know 
that s/he occupies the position of the subject, for it is forever beyond our to sense or 
mind to really know this fact. 
 The second reason that I translated “I” as 私 is the context. Since the 
character 私 in Chinese may connote an illicit action, we may see a very apparent 
connection between it and the second phrase “in flagrante delicto” (which denotes 
illicit sexual behavior). Also, “illicit” may refer to the idea carried by the pun of 性 
and 聖 that sex is holy—in my Chinese (Cantonese) pun, a sexualist is someone 
who believes in or practices the theory of God. Moreover, it is also illicit as well as 
secret that what we thought of as a very natural, very personal (私 ) sexual 
relationship does not exist, or for it to (somehow) exist God must participate (the 
irony and the contrast of the sacred holiness and the dirty deed!)—the Other must be 
situated between the man and the woman in order for a sexual relationship to 
“function”. And if we link this back to catching red-handed as a scenario set up for 
the Other (to believe that I do not have the agalma), we may think of it this way that 
the secret of adultery is that its ultimate meaning lies in the discovery “in flagrante 
delicto”.  
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5. The Restriction of Language and the Alienation of the 
(Divided) Subject: Proper Names and Sexuation 
 
 One of the most crucial theoretical concepts that I intend to highlight through 
my exploratory translation is the restricting and alienating ability of language. To 
investigate the limitative nature of language, I want to discuss the essence of two 
vital constituents of the Subject’s Symbolic identity: proper names and gender. In the 
first paragraph of the Sappho section in Art & Lies, Winterson emphasizes the 
relation between language, through the form of proper names, and sex, in its 
manifestation of the delicacy of the body. These are the fourth and the fifth lines of 
the first Sappho chapter, on page 51. “Say my name and you say sex. Say my name 
and you say white sand under a white sky white trammel of my thighs.” These two 
lines have recurred in the later part of the same chapter, as thus: “The word and the 
kiss are one. Is language sex? Say my name and you say sex. Say my name and you 
say white sand under a white sky white trammel of my thighs” (66). 
 One significant concept embodied in these two lines is that by articulating a 
proper name, a signifier, the speaker has articulated sex. In other words, there is an 
exquisite relation between names as signifiers and sex that Winterson intends to 
highlight. Therefore I asked myself, is it possible to show the intimate connection 
between names and sex in the translation? Can I do anything more than merely 
putting the literal meanings of these two sentences in Chinese? To think of an 
innovative translation to demonstrate the intimacy between names and sex, we have 
to understand how Winterson thinks of names, and I will be investigating this in 
carefully later in this chapter. To accentuate the notion that to articulate a name is to 
articulate sex, I translate the term name into 性明, xìngmín, which is a Cantonese as 
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well as a Mandarin homophone of the vocabulary item 姓名 for name in Chinese. 
My experimental coinage 性明 is formed by two characters: the first one is 性, 
which is formed by the radical of the heart and the character 生 for birth and 
growth. As mentioned in section 4.4, while a sexualist is a 性論者, the character 性 
is sex/sexuality and nature or temperament, and can at the same time stand for  
“gender”, which is 性別. The second character of my coinage is 明, an iconic 
character formed by 日 (sun) and 月 (moon). 明 means brightness (光明) as a 
noun when it is combined with the character 光 (light). But while the character 明 
is interpreted as a verb, it can mean to ‘understand’ when it is combined with the 
character 白 (white), to form the word 明白 (understand). 
 
 
5.1 Proper Names, Naming and Translation: Restriction and Rebellion 
 
 The homophone 性明 is, as explained above, coined in order to enhance the 
link between proper names and sex, a significant theme adumbrated by Jeanette 
Winterson in Art & Lies. When it comes to obsession, Winterson is not only 
obsessed with telling the same story of boundaries and desire, but is also obsessive 
about the nature of names and the issue of naming, for naming is a means of 
restriction in both Asian and Western myths. In one of the Four Great Classical 
Novels of Chinese literature, Journey to the West (西遊記), there are two characters 
whose assaults depend on proper names. One is the Pagoda Bearing Heavenly King (
托塔天王), Li Jing (李靖), whose pagoda absorbs people who answer him when he 
calls their proper names, while the other one is the antagonist, the Golden Horned 
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King (金角大王), whose purplish-reddish Gold Wine Gourd works the same way as 
Li’s pagoda. When it comes to children’s stories from the West, one of the most 
popular fairy tales about names is, without doubt, Rumpelstiltskin from the Brothers 
Grimm collection. The imp Rumpelstiltskin, who had an agreement with the queen 
while she was trapped in the dungeon about claiming her first child, left the baby 
uninjured when the queen knew his name. Therefore, we may see that the concept of 
naming as power is prevalent and universal in different cultures, and Jeanette 
Winterson is definitely one of those who find this idea fascinating.  
 As we may observe from Winterson’s novels, she has felt a tendency to play 
with the names of her characters since she first started her writing career in the 
1980s. In her debut Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit (1985), Winterson playfully 
names her protagonist Jeanette so as to imply the semi-autobiographical nature of 
this Bildungsroman. Moreover, in the same novel there is another character whose 
name is Winnet Stonejar, an anagram of “Jeanette Winterson” that it is formed by the 
exact type (though not token) of letters. In Oranges, Winterson depicts a situation of 
Winnet being spied upon, tricked and controlled by a sorcerer. At first, the sorcerer 
threatens Winnet by declaring that he knows her name, which makes Winnet 
extremely scared because “[i]f this were true she would be trapped. Naming meant 
power. Adam had named the animals and the animals came at his call.” Later on, the 
sorcerer persuades Winnet to lower her defenses and dine with him. She asks how 
she knows she can trust him, and he says “[b]ecause I don’t know your name.”  The 
two of them ends up playing the game Hangman and Winnet says to him, “if you can 
guess my name, I’ll be yours.” And of course he guesses her full name successfully, 
based on the riddle that she has given him, and she becomes his apprentice (138-
140). From the above scenario, we know that Winterson is fascinated by the idea of 
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naming, and that she believes to a certain extent that knowing a certain person’s 
name is power—hence proper names may function as a form of limitation.  
  Naming, i.e. granting a person or an object a name, concerns power 
difference. It is always the ones who occupy the higher level in a hierarchy that name 
those who are, relatively, “inferior”—the most radical examples are that masters 
name slaves and owners name pets. More subtle examples include the naming of 
children by parents and wives taking their husbands’ surnames in marriage: in 
traditional patriarchal culture, it is very normal, for normal is the norm of males, for 
a woman to inherit the husband’s surname so as to imply that she is married into the 
family. The person who is named always occupies the lower position in the power 
difference, which means that, or is the reason why, s/he is restricted.  
 In other words, any naming ceremony, i.e. the action of naming, is more than 
giving a person or an object a reference term per se. It can be interpreted as an 
indication of a relationship—for instance, it may demonstrate the extent of 
someone’s possession of power over me. Simultaneously, names can be regarded as 
an indication of the degree of possession of knowledge about a certain person, for 
intimacy influences formality (i.e. usually the better that you know me, the less 
formally you will address me). When this relation between names and possession 
develops to the highest degree, it is through the act of naming that one declares 
possession—children have a tendency to name their beloved toys, yet they do not 
name just any toys; they only name the ones that their dear mothers purchased for 
them, because the naming ceremony declares that the specific toys belong to them.   
 Because there is never a valid explanation why a certain person or object has 
a certain name, names, or any kind of significations, are always arbitrary; to name a 
certain object is to establish an arbitrary relationship between a signifier and a 
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signified; and yet the arbitrary relationship is established so well that the proper 
names get deep down to the root of our being, that we feel so natural when someone 
addresses us by calling our names. This is, to a certain extent, a hegemonic 
subjectivization that the identity as well as the mind of the subject is constructed (and 
hence limited) so much by our discourses that we have identified with and 
internalized the alien signifiers as part of us—when we address the other person or 
vice versa, proper names are not only necessary but come to us very directly and 
naturally—we rarely stop and think, or feel awkward, for calling someone by his 
name unless the name is a new one (e.g. newborn babies, or when an older person’s 
name is changed for some certain reasons). As a result, there is an irreducible gap 
between the “internal” (phenomenological, feeling-based, experiential) and the 
“external” (objectivizing) aspects of the theory of naming. Regardless of where the 
idea of the name originates from, blessings, names of saints or grandparents, to call 
someone by a proper name is to (naturally) reflect and reinforce the internalized 
arbitrary relationship between the signifier and the signified, which implies that a 
certain person is a subject (of that name). What is a subject? The Lacanian subject is 
the S in the top left-hand corner of Schema L; it is the unknowing stupid subject 
whose existence can never be demonstrated. If we are to look into the spelling of the 
word “subject”, we may see it as sub-ject, for sub- is the prefix for “under” and -ject 
is eject, being forced or thrown out in a violent manner. A subject is, therefore, a 
dummy who is thrown under tides of power and forces, and here of course I mean 
the small reflective others and the unconscious big Other, as again demonstrated very 
clearly in Schema L (Figure 1), an elucidation of the intersubjective dialectic of the 
subject. 
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 The top left-hand corner, S, is the (divided) subject, which is directly 
influenced by a’, the small other in the upper right-hand corner, which is usually 
embodied by human beings in real life yet is merely a subject’s psychological (hence 
fictional) construct. At the lower right-hand corner there is the big Other A, which is 
an abstract and impersonal projection of the small other a’. Both a’ and A are the 
introjected outsider(s) who play(s) a critical role in the subject’s self-perception (the 
ego, a) and hence dominate the subject, S. This invisible big Other originates from 
language and the Symbolic order, controls the subject by functioning as his/her 
unconscious, which results in the alienation of the divided subject. (The split subject 
is situated between ‘being’ and ‘thinking’ in the vel of alienation, meaning that either 
S is not thinking—thinking in the sense of unconscious thought, and thus results in a 
false being, or S is not.)  
 So, we as constructed subjects are restricted and alienated by language. But 
why is a proper name a very special signifier which restricts us more than any other? 
Bruce Fink has provided us a clear explanation in The Lacanian Subject: Between 
Language And Jouissance (1995): 
 
The empty set as the subject’s place-holder within the Symbolic order is 
not unrelated to the subject’s proper name. That name is often selected 
long before the child’s birth, and it inscribes the child in the Symbolic. A 
priori, this name has absolutely nothing to do with the subject; it is as 
foreign to him or her as any other signifier. But in time this signifier—
more, perhaps, than any other—will go to the root of his or her being and 
become inextricably tied to his or her subjectivity. It will become the 
signifier of his or her very absence as subject, standing in for him or her. 
(53) 
 
 Until this point it is not difficult to see the boundary: proper names keep 
subjects under restriction. But how to get free from this intolerable burden? To go 
beyond the restriction we need translation. Jacques Derrida has raised a 
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groundbreaking point on the nature of proper names from a translation perspective in 
“Des Tours de Babel” (1979/1985). In this article, Derrida argues that names do not 
belong to any system of languages, i.e. they are the rebellious signifiers which resist 
a total submission to the Symbolic. He denies the translatability of the proper name 
like this: “It comments, explains, paraphrases, but does not translate. At best it 
reproduces approximately and by dividing the equivocation into two words that 
where confusion gathered in potential […] ‘Peter’ in this sense is not a translation of 
Pierre, any more than Londres is a translation of ‘London’.” In other words, Derrida 
suggests that when we come to proper names, it is not about good or bad translation; 
instead, there is no translation. Not even the primordial proper name “Babel”, which 
is “at once proper name and common noun, [signifying that] confusion also becomes 
proper name and common noun, the one as the homonym of the other, the synonym 
as well”, has ever been translated (109-110). 
 If Lacan believes that proper names are signifiers partly responsible for the 
alienation of the barred subject, then Derrida believes that names are signifiers of the 
indication of the alienness and the otherness of the system of language. Due to the 
Symbolic deadlock that the proper name “remains forever untranslatable, [it] may 
lead one to conclude that [proper name] does not strictly belong to the language, to 
the system of the language, be it translated or translating” (Derrida 109-10). For 
Derrida, untranslatability as the fundamental attribute of proper names marks them as 
the improper and riotous elements of language, which remind us of the defect of the 
imperfect Symbolic order; they are something which remains forever foreign, alien, 
and other, something locating outside the system of languages and beyond the 
Symbolic order. They symbolize both a restriction and a rebellion. 
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5.2 Gender and Sexuation: The Empty Signifier 
 
 性明. 性 is a constituent of 性明, implying that sex/gender is a component 
of a name. Gender, in Chinese, is 性別; 別 is difference, therefore 性別 is sexual 
difference. What is the nature of proper names? As mentioned in the previous 
sections, names give definitions to and restrict subjects, but surreptitiously resist a 
total submission to the Symbolic. This is the same for sex, gender, and sexual 
difference. 
 Here is the Lacanian graph of sexuation (Figure 3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graph of Sexuation 
    
 For Lacan, the difference between masculine and feminine subjects is based 
on the phallic signifier, ф, but strictly speaking there is no sexual difference. As 
Lacan himself has put down in Seminar XX, sexual difference, if any, is merely a 
constructed fantasy whose authenticity is based on the phallic signifier, which is 
basically an empty signifier that stands for nothing. As a result, this empty signifier 
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inevitably refers to no meaning but failure in symbolization. In other words, rather 
than a biological fact or a cultural construct, sexuation is a trauma of symbolization, 
an eternal deadlock which implies the impossibility of symbolization, hence the 
haunting presence of the Real which can never be captured in the Symbolic order. 
 The phallus is the signifier of the lack. We may think of the phallus as a 
Symbolic stopping point before Symbolic loss. For example, a man purchases a 
ridiculously expensive sports car as a symbol of his physiological manhood—this 
sports car supports the narrative of his identity yet it ultimately symbolizes the lack 
(here, the lack in his manhood is not equivalent to a lack of manhood; the man may 
feel manly to a certain extent, yet there can still and would always be a certain 
degree of lack in his manhood because the physiological manhood simply does not 
and cannot exist ontologically. However, when we approach the argument from this 
perspective, we may come to a very interesting conclusion, which i:, there is nothing 
which has no lack. Why would I say that? Think about something which exists 
ontologically—for us to be able to sense it or think about it, it must be symbolized to 
a certain extent, which means, there must be a remainder left behind which is not 
included in the symbolization; and surplus is, without doubt, the twin sister of lack—
the residue in signification implies the lack in the signifiers (that they are not 
possible to symbolize everything 100%), and therefore whatever symbolized must 
carry a lack, just like phallic jouissance must fail. And as for some mutually existing 
concepts, what Žižek called the big Other, it is a formless God without a body, i.e. 
ideologies which “exist” in our mind or unconscious as forces but do not exist 
ontologically—and this would again be a kind of lack. In other words, there is 
nothing without lack). The reason behind this is that the car implies not only his 
manhood but his insecurity about it: we only need to supplement something that is 
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not enough; rather than being very proud of his manhood, the man is worrying that 
he is not manly enough and therefore he seeks refuge through the car. The same logic 
applies to women who are obsessed with makeup. Women who attempt to achieve a 
prettier or sexier look through makeup, instead of feeling content with their physical 
appearance, (either consciously or unconsciously) believe that they are not gorgeous 
enough, and it is the feeling of worry and insecurity which drives them to purchase 
cosmetics. If we think from this perspective, the real job that a marketing strategy or 
advertisement does is not to show the potential customers how good they would look 
or feel after using a certain product, but rather to construct the stars or models as a 
fantasy, an ideal which is so much better than the audience that the potential 
customers would feel insecure or inferior and then would buy the product to fulfill 
their needs. This reminds me of the Say’s Law (Jean-Baptiste Say) that it is the 
emergence of an excessive supply (product) which retroactively triggers the demand 
(lack).
7
 Rather than selling through the concept of identification (i.e. I will look like 
Kate Moss if I buy this lipstick), it is the other way round, the advertisements are 
raising our desire to purchase a product by differentiating and alienating us from the 
artist or character in the ad through the renouncing of our insecurity. This interesting 
example points out an important point in our discussion, that (1) a supplement is 
adopted to fulfill the lack and (2) a lack can be retroactively created through the 
emergence of a supplement. Therefore, the intertwined relation between a 
supplement and a lack is much more complicated than we usually assume. This can 
help us understand Lacan’s teaching of desire and repetition. To Lacan, desire is 
                                                 
7
 It is now believed that the Say’s Law is flawed. Both situations of supply creating demand and 
demand creating supply exist, due to lots of external factors (e.g. inflation, a large scale of 
immigration). However, some people argue that the definition of “demand” should be purchasing 
power rather than simply wanting (therefore a product must be put on sell before a potential customer 
may buy it), and some suggest that the definition of supply should be counted in a greater scale (hence 
when someone works to earn money to purchase something, the work that s/he does is always a kind 
of supply to some other products or to the society). 
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aroused by objet a, a lack which emerges (with das Ding) in the intrusion of 
language—and Lacan suggests that we have language first, prior to anything for a 
subject, and then it creates the lack (because of the slippage between the signifieds 
and the signifiers), and then we chase after all kinds of possible things (for us to be 
able to perceive these “things” we need to submit to language and hence no matter 
how we approach these “things”, our experience is still restricted) hoping to return to 
the state before castration. In other words, it is again the supplement (i.e. language, 
for it does not come to us “in nature”) retroactively creating a lack which has to be 
constantly attempted (and failed) to be fulfilled by chasing after (something created 
by) this supplement. In other words, the sport car, as the symbol of manhood, 
paradoxically symbolizes the man’s lack in it for it is the very lack which motivates 
his search for symbols so as to compensate for the lack. And since a perfect 
symbolization is impossible, every form of symbolization has phalluses and gender is 
no exceptional case.  
 
 
5.3 性明 
 
    From the above paragraphs, the similarity between proper names and 
sexuation should be made extremely clear, i.e. the reasons of the coinage of the term
性明 should be fully justified. Both proper names and gender are conspirators in the 
alienation (and thus formation) of the Lacanian subject. By reinforcing the wholeness 
of the fragmented subject, proper names and gender simultaneously grant the subject 
a Symbolic identity and restrict it. Aren’t these two actions always happening 
together, both granting a Symbolic identity as a kind of symbolization, and 
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restricting that identity, so that symbolization always fails? Both proper names and 
gender are the essential constituents of the construction of a Symbolic identity, yet 
they surreptitiously rebel against the Symbolic, i.e. refuse to submit completely to 
the Symbolic order: the former through its untranslatability and the latter through the 
empty signifier. Proper names and gender are both situated at the border of the 
Symbolic, contemplating the verging on the fathomless Real which yields jouissance. 
As we are told by Lacan, the movement between two registers (the Symbolic and the 
Real) yields jouissance, which can be understood as a necessary outcome of defying 
the Symbolic, hence an indispensable follow-up similarity between proper names 
and sexuation. 
 Both proper names and gender are constructions of the Symbolic yearning for 
a minimal escape from the big Other to the abyss of the fathomless Real. Isn’t that 
how proper names and gender are similar to literature and translation, always urging 
for a flight from lukewarm familiarity to the fertilizing, enticing yet terrifying 
otherness of the new? And doesn’t this sound very much like sexual climax, la petite 
mort? The longing for the loss of the Symbolic identity can be read as a longing for 
Symbolic suicide, in other words, for death, or madness—and isn’t it the reason why 
most non-scholars (or some over-conservative academics) tend to accuse us of being 
hysterical and insane when we present homonymic translations like 性明 to them? 
 From the ancient Chinese culture and philosophy, all the ten thousand things 
are constituted by yin and yang, with yang parallel with masculinity, the sun, day, 
left and life, while yin is parallel with femininity, the moon, night, right and death. If 
we are to read the character 明 iconically, isn’t the 月 (moon) in it much bigger in 
ratio than the 日 (sun)? And can’t we reasonably see it as the capture of the split 
single moment of yin dominating over yang, of death over life, of the feminine, 
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unstable and disruptive Real over the masculine, stable and positing Symbolic? Also, 
the character 明 itself is constructed by 日 (sun) and 月 (moon), which again can 
be read as a symbolization of yang and yin (hence men and women), which refers 
back to the character 性 (sex/gender) in 性明. 
 Moreover, 明 in its verb form is “to understand”. When we consider 明 
with 性 , and altogether 性明 , it implies that to understand name as sexual 
difference and restriction, as well as to notice the restrictive plus rebellious nature of 
proper names and sexuation (i.e. to understand them as fundamentally empty cultural 
constructions which fragmentize and alienate us as subjects), is intellectually smart 
enough to really 明, understand, what names and languages are. 
 Therefore, 性明, more than a sheer acoustic Chinese homonym of 姓名, is 
in fact both a semantic and dynamic iconic manifestation of the rebellious nature of 
proper names and sexuation, a picture of the moment of the verging on the absent 
Real, and hence Symbolic suicide. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation is a Lacanian perspective on literature, translation and the 
activity of reading. Through the investigation of reader’s intersubjectivity and an 
attempt plus discussion of the psychoanalytic approach to translate Winterson’s Art 
& Lies, I have sought to argue the following points: 
 
(1) The emergence and transmission of meanings are never unidirectional. Contrary 
to the mainstream belief that, having been put by writers into the texts, meanings 
sit there waiting for a reader to perceive them, the approach I have adopted here 
sees readers as playing an equally important, or arguably more influential role, in 
the construction of meanings. 
(2) A psychoanalytical approach to translation may help us rethink the definition of 
the term “translation”. When the production of a translatum through alternative 
means may result in a target text which carries more potential layers of 
interpretation, we may want to question the mainstream ideology of a 
metempsychotic translation.  
(3) The challenge of the definition of a “translation” evokes our consideration of the 
task of a scholar and the need of a perpetual undermining and overthrowing of 
the centre, which ensures the development and progress of our knowledge. 
 
 
6.1 The Construction and Transmission of Meanings 
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 There is no doubt that authors have a huge influence on the transmission of 
meanings through the text. When we are presented the phrase, for instance, “the end-
stop of the universe”, it is quite unlikely that a sane reader will be reminded of 
bulldogs or cheese. However, I insisted on using the word “transmission” rather than 
“construction” when I described the relation between authors and texts, because 
meanings are constructed by readers rather than writers. Although authors’ influence 
on texts is unarguably enormous, it is on the other hand not as dramatic as people 
commonsensically believe. As I have demonstrated clearly in this thesis, the 
construction of meanings occurs in the minds of readers, making meanings readers’ 
psychological (hence fictional) construction and the projection of the writers (rather 
than the individual writers per se) and therefore are definitely intertwined with 
readers’ (inter)subjectivity. The traditional belief, which is very popular in the 
mainstream, about not only translation but also the construction and transmission of 
meanings is refuted in this dissertation. 
 If metempsychotic translation is really the way things are, then meanings are 
the essence of texts and languages are merely the carriers. Translation and reading 
are therefore both mechanical processes and: 
(1)  Equivalent translations can be achieved; 
(2)  Human subjectivity is not involved in the process of translation; 
(3)  It is possible to know the meanings or intentions, i.e. the mind, of writers 
through reading, since it is writers who put the meanings (soul) into the texts, 
and therefore 
(4)  Meanings are solely dependent on writers. Readers’ only job is to decode 
those meanings and therefore be subordinate to the author-ity of the writers, If 
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a reader interprets something different from the intention of the writer, it must 
be a mistake or a deviation.  
 
But of course, our understanding of meanings and translation has proved all the four 
conclusions above wrong. As I have explained with concrete examples in this paper:  
(1) It is impossible to achieve an equivalent translation due to both linguistic and 
cultural limitation;  
(2) Human subjectivity is involved in the process of reading, and 
(3) It is impossible to read the mind of the writers, and 
(4) Meanings depend more on readers than writers precisely because they are not 
really “transmitted” through a medium (language) but are created in the mind 
of the readers (under the limitation of the writers, of course, as we won’t 
interpret “end-stop” as a keyboard). 
 
In other words, even though the writer has definitely attempted to direct the reader’s 
mind to a certain way of thinking, the “space” that we may move around in the 
construction of meaning is not as restrictive as people usually think. This notion of 
the generation of meanings as somewhere between the writers and readers is not an 
innovative one—however, I would like to take this thesis as my first step in the 
investigation of the construction and transmission of meanings, and most importantly 
to explain how a large number of language users in a linguistic and cultural group 
can understand a certain word in a very similar way while some readers may 
interpret the text differently or even contrastingly. I am hoping that the answers to 
these questions may explain the ultimate question in the construction or transmission 
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of meanings, which is, how writers may restrict the interpretation of meanings in the 
readers mind when meanings are the psychological constructions of the readers. 
 
 
6.2 Reading Psychoanalytically as an Alternative Translation Strategy, and 
the Task of a Scholar 
 
 A psychoanalytical approach to translation can produce target texts which 
carry more meanings than the source texts, as carefully demonstrated by my 
experimental Chinese translation of Art & Lies. One problem that I expect to 
encounter in my research direction is that the majority, who are so contently and 
comfortably situated within the centre while naturalizing it (unconsciously) as the 
normal way that things should/must be, will resist it as opposed to what Douglas 
Robinson calls metempsychotic translation: Surely it is XYZ, everyone agrees that it 
is XYZ and certainly you want it to be this way, don’t you? It is hegemonic, and 
therefore “correct” and “natural,” to assign the author total author-ity, and to regard 
as flawed a translation that deviates from authorial intention, whether by adding to or 
subtracting from the source text. 
 Ultimately, what they articulate is that a translation is flawed just because it is 
not the source text. All translations are bad translations because they are not the 
originals. While critics rarely say this outright, and might even be inclined to deny 
that any such view undergirds their claims, I argue that this simplistic orientation to 
translations is in fact surprisingly common. If I am right, surely it is our duty as 
scholars to identify and root out such assumptions. Although metempsychotic 
translation is very tempting and “plausible” as it occupies the position of the centre, 
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my remarks about readers’ intersubjectivity and the logic at work behind 
metempsychotic translation strongly suggest that this approach to translation is 
hugely flawed (see Chapter 6.1 for the summary of the unreasonable conclusions 
reached by metempsychotic translation). To stand against the mainstream is 
undoubtedly a difficult task, but our roles as academics deny us the luxury of 
neglecting the facts to stay in the comfort zone when we know that the centre is 
wrong. For scholars, hiding one’s head in the sand like an ostrich is a dangerous and 
idle response to uncomfortable observations. Here, instead of suggesting that 
translating through the incorporation of critical and psychoanalytical theories must 
be the “right” or the best way to translate, I am attempting to highlight the necessity 
to experiment and explore, to discover new methods and new ideas, when what we 
have at hand in the centre is full of mistakes and inconsistence. This is the only way 
for us to improve and make progress.  
 When it comes to the criticism that the Chinese versions I have offered of the 
first three sentences of the Sappho section in Art and Lies do not constitute a 
translatum as I have “deviated” too much in my psychoanalytical translation of 
Winterson, I would like to emphasize the linkage between the source text and the 
target text through the utilization of homophones—if my translation is not a 
translation, there was no need for me to keep the meaning of “end-stop”, “universe” 
or “in flagrante delicto” in my Chinese translation. And second, I would also like to 
prompt my readers into the thinking activity of the nature of “translation”—what is 
the definition of “translation”? If you think that my translation is not a translation, 
regardless of the obvious relation between the source text and the target text, then 
what is a translation? A piece which is highly equivalent to the target text? A piece in 
which “deviation” only exists in obligatory shifts? If you believe that a translator 
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should translate a text as closely as possible to the source text, you are then spoken 
by the Author and, as explained in this dissertation, meanings and interpretations 
depend relatively more on readers than writers. Why would you still want to restrict 
translation or reading to the author’s meanings, when (1) we may never know the 
author’s exact meanings in the first place, and (2) different readers can read different 
meanings from the same piece of text? If two readers interpret the theme of a text in 
a contrasting way, which one is the meaning of the text? Depending on the writer? 
But can’t the writer lie about his/her intention, or can’t s/he simply not notice all the 
possible interpretations of the texts? The Pixar team said the cartoon Wall-E does not 
carry any messages of environmental protection but is only a romantic love story of 
two robots—do you believe that? Does it mean that we cannot read anything more 
than a love story in this film? Barthes criticized the hegemony of the Author in the 
1970s—why would we want to go back to the time before that? Isn’t it progress that 
we all want?  
 Real progress and development can only be made through the endless 
challenging and overthrowing of the centre, especially when we see the 
inconsistency and incompleteness of the mainstream. Many people follow the 
dominant beliefs because they are not intelligent or blessed enough to understand or 
be exposed to alternative ways of thinking, but as for academics, our task should be 
to constantly push the periphery to the centre in order to achieve authentic progress 
and approach the truth. 
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